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3Chapter 1: Introduction 
In a characteristically audacious opinion, the Supreme Court in 1965 declared 
privacy a fundamental right in its opinion for Griswold v. Connecticut. Despite its 
audacity, this assertion went largely unnoticed in most segments of society.  But nearly a 
decade later, Congress declared privacy a fundamental right in the highly-anticipated 
Federal Privacy Act of 1974.  Though the two statements were equally potent and legally 
binding, each focused on disparate aspects of the right to privacy and sought to regulate 
in independent realms.  Why was this, and how did it happen?  This project seeks to 
explain what happened during those nine years to propel privacy from the deeper social 
consciousness into mainstream discourse and gave it the vitality it needed to command a 
response from the legislature.  Whatever this momentum, it gave privacy the life it would 
need to pervade society today, more than thirty years later.   
 I argue that it was exactly this—the independent development of privacy in 
separate spheres, each with different intentions—that allowed privacy to take on a life of 
its own.  This research analyzes privacy’s legal development in Griswold and Roe v. 
Wade in 1973, and then shifts to focus on privacy’s social and political path to 
fundamentality during the same time period.  I conclude that the steady increase in 
privacy activity and awareness between 1965 and 1973 worked to put increasing pressure 
on something of a privacy dam—a blockade that prevented complete understanding or 
regulation of privacy.  In 1973, two key events occurred in separate realms which caused 
the dam to break entirely, resulting in the 1974 Privacy Act.   
 First, this project follows privacy’s path in the legal sphere by examining Court 
opinions, case briefs, and trends in legal argument and analysis.  After a discussion of 
4Griswold and its aftermath, this thesis traces the ten cases before Roe in which the Court 
mentions privacy.  It then touches on the Court’s composition and the presidential politics 
involved in judicial appointments pertinent to privacy, discusses trend change and 
continuity between the Warren Court and the Burger Court, and concludes with an in-
depth discussion of Roe v. Wade. In short, it asserts that the Court struggled to define the 
concept of privacy between 1965 and 1973.  Its privacy cases centered largely around 
criminals and deviants, and with the exception of Justice William O. Douglas, the justices 
refused to apply their new concept of privacy in most of these cases.  Still, it took the first 
steps toward a systematic breakdown of privacy’s individual components by examining it 
as specifically applied to criminal justice, tax evasion, and sexual deviance.  Though it 
denied privacy in the majority of these cases, it still began a trend of breaking down 
privacy and comparing it to other fundamental rights.  Douglas’ persistent defense of 
privacy came to fruition in Roe v. Wade, with the Court’s declaration that privacy 
irrefutably existed in the Constitution.  The question was no longer whether a right to 
privacy existed, but whether or not it included abortion.   
 Next, the thesis traces privacy’s political growth, by discussing White House 
behaviors, legislative activity, media responses, and public opinion data.  Through the use 
of Congressional committee publications, proposed legislation, newspaper articles and 
secondary sources, it presents privacy in both a legal and sociopolitical realm in an 
attempt to explain privacy’s path.  It begins with a discussion of privacy in Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s presidency.  It begins with a discussion of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI) spying practices, discusses the unusual liaison between the White 
House and the FBI, and the resulting press coverage, and last follows the Congressional 
5backlash to the illicit executive behavior, and the public’s reaction to the influx of 
unusual governmental activity.  The thesis then conducts a similar reconstruction of 
media, legislative and public activity under Richard Nixon’s administration until news of 
the Watergate scandal hit the front pages.  These chapters argue that Congress, unlike the 
Court, seemed unconcerned with criminal and reproductive privacy.  Instead, in the early 
1960s, it began to examine privacy from governmental intrusions.  Beginning when J. 
Edgar Hoover and the F.B.I began spying on domestic organizations like the Black 
Panthers, the Ku Klux Klan, and politicians themselves, Congress became motivated to 
investigate the FBI’s behavior.  Along the way, it discovered myriad other agencies that 
were blatantly invading citizens’ privacy.  Even without a particular definition of privacy, 
it was clear that the federal government had crossed a line.  As Congress learned more 
and more about federal intrusions, it publicized its findings.  Politicians, the media and 
the scholarly elite engaged in a discourse about privacy rights and how exactly they could 
protect those rights.  Despite the media and political attention, though, the general public 
remained largely unmotivated to work for its own privacy rights.  In other words, the 
public was upset and fearful about the government investigating it , but did very little 
about it.  After 1965, this discourse slowly filtered down to the public until 1973 when 
President Nixon’s Watergate scandal hit the public full-force and the Court handed down 
Roe v. Wade.
Last, this thesis argues that the two-pronged attack on those who would reduce 
privacy rights, from Roe v. Wade and the fallout from Watergate, produced a flood of 
privacy related activity that left Congress with little choice but to pass the Privacy Act of 
1974.  It was in 1973 that the public was bombarded with the reality of the privacy 
6situation: the federal government was compulsively gathering information on innocent 
individuals and the Court was in a position to take away privacy rights not from criminals 
or deviants, but from everyday women.  Even though the Court had declared privacy to 
be a fundamental right in 1965, it still had full authority to define the right.  In 1973, it 
threatened to constrict its broad right to an idea that could otherwise be found in the text 
of the Constitution.  At last, the public was motivated to act.  The dam had broken and 
the torrent of privacy-related activity followed.  In late 1973 with the public fully 
mobilized and the media relentlessly pursuing stories on governmental privacy invasions, 
Congress began to take the necessary steps to dissect and protect privacy.  Congress 
formed a host of committees designed with the sole purpose of researching privacy 
invasions, used privacy protection as its national platform, and proposed over 250 pieces 
of legislation protecting the right.  Within a year, Congress passed the Federal Privacy 
Act, which declared privacy a fundamental right and laid out guidelines for protecting it.  
It was a problematic makeshift solution to what had become a nationwide problem, but it 
was a solution, nonetheless.  With the combination of the Court’s application of privacy 
to everyday women and Congress’ work to ensure future protection of privacy, the surge 
of activity began to recede and America began to return to a more stable state.  
Nevertheless, the idea of a fundamental right of privacy became engrained in the 
American psyche and continued to increase throughout the gay-rights movement, the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, and the war on terrorism, and even today shows no signs 
of retreating. 
In sum, I argue that the differing approaches, reflecting a social argument 
conflicting with the concept, give privacy full-fledged salience in contemporary 
7American society.  Because privacy began as a commonly understood and 
constitutionally supported right to personal property, and then took diverging paths 
between the Court, which largely dealt with criminal, deviant, and reproductive privacy, 
and the legislature, which dealt with privacy intrusions by the government, it filtered 
through to society from two entirely different directions.  The multiple-fold influence on 
the public eye has given privacy particular potency today.   
Still, this discussion begs the question of privacy’s importance as a source of 
concern.  Do we not have more pressing legal and political matters with which to occupy 
our time and energy?  In fact, we do not.  A surprising number of issues past and present 
fall under privacy’s reach, including those which do not seem like privacy issues at all.  
In fact, privacy subsumes nearly every civil liberties issue we face.  It encompasses 
relationships, the body, the mind, the home, and the family.  It determines how a family 
can school its children, what a person can look at and where he can look at it, and 
whether a criminal can be convicted with the evidence presented.  Put differently, privacy 
is a defense for many other fundamental liberties.  It is both the starting ground and the 
ending point for many different breeds of rights talk.  For example, abortion, same-sex 
marriage, sodomy all began with privacy claims and became more narrowly-tailored from 
there.  Wiretapping, religion, property and self-incrimination all end up at an individual’s 
right to privacy.  In other words, privacy exists in nearly social realm: the body, the mind, 
the home, and the family.  Also, privacy is unique because it can only be granted at the 
expense of other liberties.  If we feel entitled to it or want to discuss it, we must 
understand that something else will have to give in order for privacy to prevail.  This 
creates a unique clash of fundamental rights, tied together by privacy. 
8What made Griswold’s legal argument plausible is that so much of what we know 
as concrete within the Bill of Rights does indeed share some philosophical touchstones 
with a concept of privacy.  It can be legally connected to four of the first ten 
amendments, five of the first fourteen, and the “emanations from penumbras” of the 
entire Bill of Rights.  Throughout the 1960s and 70s, the Courts determined that the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourth Amendments all give foundation to various facets of 
privacy.  The First Amendment can protect our “ideas” privacy.  With several important 
exceptions, it gives us privacy to practice the religion we want, to say what we want, and 
to believe what we want.  The Fourth Amendment protects our physical privacy in our 
homes and on our bodies.  Our thoughts are also protected by the Fifth Amendment, 
under which we do not have to disclose what we know.  All other privacy-related rights 
not specifically enumerated by the Bill of Rights emanate from the Ninth Amendment, 
and courts and legislatures generally agree that the 1Fourth Amendment’s protection of 
our liberties through due process of the laws protects our right to privacy.  In these 
amendments alone we can see that privacy exists implicit in the words of the 
Constitution.  Any other applications have grown as a result of privacy’s 250 year old 
foundation.  Today, those applications cross institutions, eliciting discussion from all 
branches of government and numerous social realms, and still provide different 
interpretations and areas of focus within those separate realms.   
 
Of Property and Privacy: Historic Beginnings 
We might not have anticipated this salience from the first known scientific 
discussion of the right of privacy—Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ historic 1890 
9Harvard Law Review article asserting that privacy is the right “to be let alone.”1
Scholars and judges reacted to this article favorably, citing it amply in articles and 
opinions in following years.2 Despite their analysis of this claim, privacy remained 
ambiguous.  Congress and the courts were unsure how to regulate or protect privacy, and 
there is little indication that they wanted to protect it at all in the first half of the 20th 
century.  Perhaps this is because legislatures and courts did not view “privacy” issues as 
we view them today.   Instead, they were largely property based, as evidenced most 
famously in Lochner v. New York (1905).3 Today, though scholars credit Lochner as a 
case in which the Court refused to interfere with the privacy of an employer/employee 
relationship,4 the actual opinion was more comprehensive.  The Court declared that an 
employer and an employee have a constitutionally protected right to make a contract, 
even if the state deems it unfair.  While the state can have an interest in regulating the 
work conditions of its citizens, the employer’s right to purchase labor can be classified as 
a fundamental right to property.  From Lochner on, the government conflated “property” 
and “privacy,” creating a broad concept of private property which it could easily regulate.   
The Court and the legislature collaborated on property matters for two reasons.  
First, the courts and legislatures shared a common goal of American economic 
advancement, with the common assumption about the economic order that the economy 
began with private property.  But this is not the end of the story.  But also, as one scholar 
 
1 Warren, S. D., & Brandeis, L. D. (1890). The Right to Privacy. Harvard law review, 4(5), 193-220. 
2 See e.g., A new phase of the right to privacy.(1896). Harvard law review, 10(3), 179-180; Marks v. Jaffa 
26 N.Y. Sup. 908 (1894), Right to privacy again (1894). Harvard law review, 7(7), 425-426; and 
Larremore, W. (1912). The law of privacy. Columbia law review, 12(8), 693-708. 
3 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
4 See eg., Gavison, R. (1980). Privacy and the limits of law. The Yale law journal, 89(3), 421-471; Gillman, 
H. (1993). The Constitution besieged. Durham: Duke University Press; and Cloud, M. (1996). The Fourth 
Amendment during the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory. Stanford law 
review, 48(3), 555-631. 
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notes, property should be understood as a “bundle of sticks.”5 Like privacy, it is a 
collection of diverse interests, the most important of which is the right to exclude other 
people from one’s personal property.6 When a person is on his private property, he has a 
certain privacy interest which he is entitled to enforce through the legal system.  
Therefore, we can see a clear interplay between the legislature, which creates the 
property statutes and the courts, which judge them.    
Even early cases we commonly reference as privacy cases, like Olmstead v. US 
(1928),7 in which the Court held that evidence obtained by a wiretap on a public phone 
was admissible as evidence in trial, are most strongly overlaid with the period’s 
conception of property as the central force in rights.  For decades, the Court had 
approached it as a property issue, reasserting the 1886 decision of Boyd v. United States,
in which the Court acknowledged that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments protect an 
individual’s property from governmental intrusion, acknowledging the importance of 
privacy.8
Olmstead, Justice Brandeis attempted to distinguish privacy from property, stating 
that the Founders “conferred as against the government the right to be let alone, the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man.”  The other justices 
ignored this dissent, ruling that the Bill of Rights, and the Fourth amendment in 
particular, did not prevent the use of wiretaps on public phones because the public phone 
was not Olmstead’s private property.  
 
5 Finn, J. E. (2006).  Privacy—the early cases. Civil liberties and the Bill of Rights lecture series. Chantilly, 
Virginia: The Teaching Company. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
8 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).  
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Both property and privacy refer to larger notions about what it means to be an 
individual, to follow the American dream, and to flourish as a human being not on one’s 
own terms, but in a larger community of other individuals with other individual rights.  
Governmental agencies saw property as the boundary between the individual and society.  
However, legal trends between the 1920s and the 1960s veered away from this notion,9
under the influence of technology that enabled privacy intrusion outside the context of 
property and the changing dynamic of how and whom the government chose to 
investigate.10 By 1965, property no longer operated as the boundary between the 
individual and society.  It would be replaced, in part, by privacy.   
Unlike property, which is clearly tethered in multiple sections of the Constitution, 
privacy is an entirely different matter.  “Those rights that we call ‘privacy rights’ are 
entirely a function of judicial imagination.”11 To call them a judicial creation is to 
assume that these rights do not exist in the Constitution.  To say that the Court inferred 
them is to assume that they are explicitly implicated in the Constitution.  A middle 
position is to see the legal foundation of privacy in shades of gray.  Calling them a 
product of judicial imagination implies that the Court was willing to be both flexible and 
creative with its interpretation of the Constitution’s words.  It was not until Griswold v. 
Connecticut in 1965 that the Court claimed a Constitutional basis for the fundamental 
right of privacy, though it was divided in its decision.  Still, privacy existed as an 
autonomous right, rather than as one subsumed by a more legally solidified right, like 
 
9 Finn, J. E. (2006).  Privacy—the early cases. Civil liberties and the Bill of Rights lecture series. Chantilly, 
Virginia: The Teaching Company.  
10 United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Special Subcommittee on 
Invasion of Privacy. (1967). The computer and invasion of privacy. New York: Arno Press. 
11 Finn, J. E. (2006).  Privacy—the early cases. Civil liberties and the Bill of Rights lecture series. 
Chantilly, Virginia: The Teaching Company. 
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property or contracts.  Because privacy drifted around constitutional doctrine and lacked 
a substantive basis, it was still a function of the judicial imagination. In many ways, it 
still is today.   
Scholars do agree that since privacy took on a legal form in Griswold, the 
American public has appropriated the term into regular conversation but cannot 
necessarily define it.  It is used in common language such that the American public has 
disconnected it from its philosophical foundations.  It garners the most public attention 
when meddled with by the state, even with the increase in technology and information 
accessibility.12 Even among experts it is debated.  Harvard Law Professor Ruth Gavison 
contends that when Americans use the word “privacy,” they usually mean, “being 
completely inaccessible to others [the state included].” 13 This definition includes what 
scholars like Gavison and Gerald Dworkin agree are central themes of privacy: secrecy, 
anonymity, solitude and autonomy.14 Privacy expert Alan Westin also includes 
intimacy.15 Westin suggests that when Americans say they want “complete privacy,” 
they actually want “complete inaccessibility to others.”  Such privacy would entail 
complete withdrawal from society, often resulting in loneliness and lack of safety and 
discipline. Therefore, “[t]he individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since 
participation in society is an equally powerful desire.”16 Also, the individual does not 
actually want total noninterference by the state.  Rather, he wants state interference in the 
form of legal protection against other individuals, and noninterference with personal 
 
12 McClellan, G. S. (1976). The Right to privacy. New York: H. W. Wilson Co. 
13 Gavison, R. (1980). Privacy and the Limits of Law. The Yale law journal, 89(3), 422. 
14 See e.g., Gavison, R. (1980). Privacy and the Limits of Law. The Yale law journal, 89(3), 421-30; and 
Dworkin, G. (1976). Autonomy and behavior control. The Hastings Center Report. 6(1), 23-28. 
15 Westin, A. (1967). Privacy and Freedom. New York: Atheneum.  
16 Ibid.
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decisions. 17 It then becomes the job of the legislature to provide an appropriate amount 
of protection without infringing on personal decisions. 
This potency has only increased since the Roe era.  Studies collected by The 
Roeper Center18 and Harris Polling19 between 1974 and 2006 demonstrate that 
Americans’ concerns with threats to their personal privacy, both sexual and 
informational, continually increased, while the numbers of Americans who are not 
concerned at all about privacy rapidly dropped.  Congressional hearings, too, indicate that 
privacy is at the top of citizens’ list of political concerns.20 Furthermore, “[i]n the years 
since 9/11, Americans have become less willing to sacrifice their civil liberties—even to 
combat terrorism.”21 Immediately following the terrorist attacks, nearly half of 
Americans were willing to sacrifice their privacy rights in order to combat terrorism, but 
within nine months, two-thirds of Americans objected to privacy violations to combat 
terrorism.22 That is, Americans’ views on privacy rights have returned to their pre-
September 11 state.  This indicates unwavering public support for the right of personal 
privacy that, in the decades surrounding its inception, had questionable origins in the 
Constitution.   
Among studies about the relationship between the Supreme Court and the public, 
some scholars espouse a bottom-up approach as the most apt for discussing legal change.  
 
17 Young, John B., ed. Privacy. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978. 
18 Survey by Roper Organization. Retrieved November 19, 2006 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper 
Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. 
<http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>. 
19 Survey by Harris Polling. Retrieved November 19, 2006 from the Harris Interactive Databank, Harris 
Polling, Rochester: New York. <http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=671.> 
20United States. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Government Management, 
Information, and Technology. (2001). A complete examination of privacy protection. Washington: G.P.O. 
21 Survey by The Gallup Organization, Retrieved November 19, 2006 from the Gallup Poll Online 
Database.  The Gallup Poll, Gallup University. < http://www.galluppoll.com> 
22 Ibid. 
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In this model, scholars examine the broader, more public instigators in change and trace 
their effects through interest groups to Congress and courts.  For example, Epstein and 
Kobylka state the three main proponents in legal change: “the Court, the political 
environment, and organized pressure groups lobbying the Court,” 23 where political 
environment includes elected representatives and public opinion.  They, along with 
scholars like Charles Epp, argue that legal change initiates in activist groups and from 
lawyers.  It then works its way up to the legislature and eventually the Court.24 Other 
scholars agree, stating that Court sponsored change comes from the people: “By all 
arguable evidence the modern Supreme Court appears to reflect public opinion as 
accurately as other policy makers.”25 In their discussion of privacy, these scholars 
maintain that the revolution initiated in the grassroots.   
I do not believe this to be the case.  On the contrary, I advocate a top-down 
approach to privacy’s rapidly changed legal and political status.  This approach, opposite 
to the bottom-up approach, credits the upper echelons and elites with becoming aware of 
privacy invasions, generating more widespread interest in it, and sending it to the media, 
which then filtered it down to the general public.  In typical cases of legal or social 
change, for example the Civil Rights movement, the people were the ones experiencing 
the discrimination and advocating for change.  The same is true for the women’s rights 
movement.  The privacy movement is unique in this sense because the general public was 
unaware that their rights were being abused.  As a result, the “bottom” was unable to 
instigate the movement because it did not know there was a problem.  Until Congress and 
 
23 Epstein, L., & Kobylka, J. F. (1992). The Supreme Court and legal change : abortion and the death 
penalty. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 9. 
24 Epp, C. R. (1998). The rights revolution : lawyers, activists, and supreme courts in comparative 
perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
25 Marshall, T. R. (1989).  Public opinion and the Supreme Court.  Boston: Unwin Hyman.   
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the media caught wind of the privacy intrusions and disseminated information to other 
areas of society, those intrusions remained private.  This top-down approach is therefore 
unique to situations in which the public is unaware of or unable to act on the problem at 
hand.   
As this research demonstrates, privacy-talk originated and remained in an elite 
discourse for nearly a decade before the public took any action toward it.  It took 
continual pressure from the government and the Court and two monumental events to 
elicit a chartable public response to privacy.  In fact, with the exception of the American 
Civil Liberties Union, there was little continuity amongst the lobby groups espousing 
privacy rights, both informational and reproductive.  This was true even after Roe, at 
which point many pro-privacy interest groups turned their focus to abortion.26 
Numerous scholars have studied privacy using a compartmentalized approach, or 
examine a particular aspect of privacy in the government, Court, or society.  For example, 
the work of Alan Westin, a prolific privacy scholar, details the threats to public privacy 
through changing technology in the government.27 David M. O’Brien and Priscilla 
Regan trace different elements of privacy’s development in the legislature.28 Myriad 
scholars discuss the philosophical state of privacy today, as it is understood or 
misconstrued by lawmakers and the citizens.29 Still, current scholarship leaves 
unanswered several important questions about the reasons for privacy’s salience today.  
 
26 Epstein, L., & Kobylka, J. F. (1992). The Supreme Court and legal change : abortion and the death 
penalty. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
27 Westin, A. (1967). Privacy and Freedom. New York: Atheneum. 
28 See e.g., Regan, P. M. (1995). Legislating privacy : technology, social values, and public policy. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press.; and O'Brien, D. M. (1979). Privacy, law, and public policy. New 
York: Praeger Special Studies. 
29 See e.g., Posner, R. (1979). The uncertain protection of privacy by the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court Review; Gavison, R. (1980). Privacy and the Limits of Law. The Yale law journal, 89(3), 421-30; 
and Dworkin, G. (1976). Autonomy and behavior control. The Hastings Center Report. 6(1), 23-28. 
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While the ample privacy-related scholarship examines the disparate developments of 
privacy in America, it neglects to study privacy as a multidimensional issue with 
divergent and mutually reinforcing histories.  The privacy that Americans envision today 
did not originate from one place.  Rather, it developed as a result of two key seemingly 
unrelated influences.  That said, we can now look at privacy’s independent and divergent 
journey to fundamentality in the Court and the legislature to determine the reasons for its 
vitality today. 
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Chapter 2: “The Least Dangerous Branch” 30 
To begin the discussion of the evolution and fortification of the “right to privacy” 
in the American consciousness, we must first assess the different directions from which it 
emerged.  The legal discussion that was limited strictly to privacy began in 1965 when 
the Supreme Court declared privacy to be a fundamental right.31 Once the Court initiated 
the legal discourse about privacy, it would spend the next decade grappling with the 
concept in relation to the Constitution, and more specifically, the Bill of Rights.  
Meanwhile, privacy would gain a foothold in the other areas of society, but for entirely 
different reasons.  Because privacy emerged from many different corners of America 
simultaneously, it was particularly fit to become a topic of great social, legal, and 
political concern. 
 
Griswold v. Connecticut 
In 1961, the United States Supreme Court faced a potentially divisive decision.  
The nine justices needed to issue a decision on Poe v. Ullman,32 a case questioning the 
constitutionality of an 1879 Connecticut statute prohibiting married couples the use of 
contraceptives and prohibiting doctors from advising about contraceptives.  When the 
plaintiffs were refused consultation about contraceptives because of the statute, they 
 
30 Hamilton, A. (1788). The Federalist No. 78.  Independent Journal.
31 The Court did, indeed, address the idea of privacy before Griswold. Warren and Brandeis’ Harvard Law 
Review article originally discussed privacy as what scholars call “true” privacy.  That is the privacy I 
address in this study.  However, the courts saw many cases relating to privacy as a tort, which delineated 
into four categories.  “True” privacy is only one of them.  Other privacy torts fall under the classification of 
“false light” privacy torts, intrusion torts, or appropriation torts.  Under false light privacy, for example, a 
person’s complaint is not about his personal information being investigated, but if the information 
discovered portrays him incorrectly, or in a false light.  The Court dealt with such privacy torts thoroughly 
between 1890 and 1965, but did not grapple with the idea that privacy could be a fundamental right.  
Rather, they handled privacy like a “haystack in a hurricane.”  There was no attempt to declare it a 
constitutionally protected right or define it.  Courts only attempted to apply it on a case-by-case basis.  
Because these dealings did little to crystallize privacy in the American mentality, I do not address them 
here.  See Prosser, W. L. (1960).  Privacy.  California law review.  48(3): 383-423.   
32 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
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challenged it.  Given that the law had never been enforced, however, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the controversial Poe v. Ullman on the grounds that it was unripe.  The Court 
was able to dodge the issue in 1961, but understood the necessity of tackling it in a more 
legally appropriate case.  As soon as the Court issued its decision, Connecticut’s Planned 
Parenthood branch began devising a case on which the Court would have to issue an 
opinion.33 
The test case involved Estelle Griswold and Dr. Lee Bruxton, two of the 
architects of Poe, opening a Planned Parenthood clinic and publicly giving instruction, 
information and advice about contraception to married individuals.  They were promptly 
arrested and taken to court for violating the Connecticut statute.  The Court of Appeals to 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s guilty-finding in Griswold v. Connecticut and 
the Connecticut Supreme Court also affirmed.34 Griswold and Planned Parenthood 
applied to take their case to the United States Supreme Court. 
In 1965, the Supreme Court claimed six justices who were recognized as some of 
the most liberal in history: Earl Warren, Hugo Black, William Brennan, William 
Douglas, Abe Fortas and Arthur Goldberg.  The more conservative justices: John 
Marshall Harlan, Potter Stewart and Byron White regularly favored constriction of civil 
liberties,35 yet even so, are not regarded as so conservative as those in the 1930s or 1980s.  
The justices undoubtedly had their ideological agendas for the formation of the Court’s 
docket.  Chief Justice Warren, who was known as particularly amiable and unifying,36 
33 Bartee, A. F. (2006). Privacy rights : cases lost and causes won before the Supreme Court. Lanham, Md: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
34 Epstein, L., & Kobylka, J. F. (1992). The Supreme Court and legal change : abortion and the death 
penalty. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
35 Ibid, 14. 
36 Dixon, R. G. (1965). The right of privacy : a symposium on the implications of Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 497 (1965). New York: Da Capo Press, 1971, 60. 
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effectively marshaled these agendas into the Court’s docket.  Leadership was necessary, 
and chief justices historically have had such power to shape the Court’s direction.37 
Their decisions and influences on other justices are intensified by large numbers of 
amicus briefs, government involvement, typically found in successful Supreme Court 
appeals.38 Griswold lacked in any of these areas.  Aside from the conflicting opinions in 
lower courts and its unresolved history, many courts would have seen no particular 
urgency to this case.  Chief Justice Warren, however, recognized it as a vital issue in civil 
liberties adjudication.  The other eight justices agreed.  With very little discussion, all 
nine justices voted to grant Griswold certiorari.39 The Court saw it as Poe, round two, 
and an opportunity to issue a contraception holding once and for all.  As one of Warren’s 
clerks said, “It is clear that the issues are significant.”40 
The Planned Parenthood Federation hired Yale Law School Professor Fowler V. 
Harper, the veteran of Poe v. Ullman, to argue Griswold. Harper initially wanted to 
frame his argument around First Amendment freedoms of speech, including the right to 
give advice, as he had with Poe.41 However, “[a]fter spotting a 1962 law review article 
written by Norman Redlich, he (and others working on the case) rethought this plan.”42 
Redlich’s article suggests a fundamental right of privacy inherent in the Ninth 
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York; New York: Macmillan Pub. Co., 229. 
41 Harper briefly stated that the Connecticut statute violated the “privacy of the citizen…[and] the privacy 
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Amendment: “The Court could hold that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments reserve to a 
married couple the right to maintain the intimacy of the marital relationship without 
government interference,” and that such marital intimacy qualifies as a private right 
based on the intimations of privacy in the dissents for Poe v. Ullman.43 
However, Harper did not discard the First Amendment claim entirely.  Instead, he 
reshaped his argument to incorporate three different legal arguments.  In addition to 
building his argument around the idea that Planned Parenthood’s free speech rights had 
been infringed, he incorporated into his argument the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, asserting that those seeking advice on contraceptives had their 
rights to liberty and property violated without due process of the law.  Based upon 
Redlich’s article, though, Harper most importantly argued for a right to marital privacy 
not enumerated but allowed by the Ninth Amendment.  In the end, this was to be the crux 
of his argument.  Before he was able to argue the case, however, Harper died.  Yale Law 
School professor Thomas Emerson took over Harper’s role in the case and, while 
acknowledging the privacy argument, filed an amicus brief centered on the Due Process 
Clause argument, maintaining that the Connecticut statute constituted an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy and therefore violated due process.44 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court was preparing itself with the benefit of six amicus 
curiae briefs.45 The difficulty in formulating a response to the question was identifying a 
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constitutional source for its holding.  “While all of the [nine] brethren believed the 
Connecticut law was absolutely asinine, the tough question was whether it was 
unconstitutional,”46 one political scientist has written.  Unsurprisingly, then, the Justices’ 
7-2 holding in favor of Griswold, declaring the Connecticut statute unconstitutional, 
merely reflects one point of agreement among the Justices’ differing lines of 
constitutional argument.  In the opinion of the Court, Justice Douglas envisions a 
penumbra formed by the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, with the first eight 
amendments providing “emanations” or zones of privacy that could support the holding.  
Yet, he maintains that that marital privacy is particularly protected by the First 
Amendment right to association stating, “We deal with a right of privacy older than the 
Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school system.  
Marriage…is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, 
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.  Yet it is an 
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”47 
Justices Goldberg, Warren and Brennan grounded their support in the Ninth 
Amendment.  In the notes from the Court in conference, Warren initially states, “I can’t 
balance, use equal protection, or use a ‘shocking’ due process standard.  I can’t accept a 
privacy argument,”48 but he eventually joins with Goldberg and Brennan supporting a 
doctrine that would enable privacy as a right in the future.  They state that the effect of 
this decision will leave available a legal path to classify difficult cases using a broad 
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range of privacy liberties.  It could increase areas of judicial support by applying privacy 
to less cut-and-dry situations or in other hard to classify cases, which, despite their 
vagueness, should be retained by the people in a democracy committed to preserving 
individual liberties.49 
Justices Harlan and White base their opinions in the substantive protections of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Harlan found that restricting the use of 
contraceptives violates a value “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”50 That is, he 
states that the ability to regulate one’s own sexual and family life is a liberty, but leaves 
privacy out of the debate.  Justice White, in concurrence, states that the issue of 
overbroad legislation cannot be avoided by using a privacy argument, asserting that the 
Connecticut statute was overbroad to regulate “illicit sexual relationships”51 and refusing 
to apply privacy. 
The two dissenters, Justices Black and Stewart, dissented on the grounds that 
privacy is nowhere to be found in the Constitution, despite their claims that they were not 
“anti-privatists.”52 Justice Black was the only justice to stress the fact that “‘privacy’ is a 
broad, abstract and ambiguous concept,” 53 too broad to read into the words of the 
Constitution. “Privacy is broader than any one amendment because several of the specific 
guarantees are designed in part to protect something that might be called privacy, but 
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each guarantee is also broader than privacy,”54 and should therefore be more narrowly 
tailored.   
Modern-day scholars agree on the gravity of Griswold’s legal impact.55 At the 
time, however, it was not a watershed case.  Practically, Griswold did nothing more than 
declare unconstitutional Connecticut’s out-moded anti-birth control statute.  However, 
the constitutional principle grew between 1965 and 1973, when the Court issued its Roe 
v. Wade opinion.  By that time, privacy had become a fundamental part of Constitutional 
doctrine.  From there, it became the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut. Period 
scholars disagreed on its immediate implications and emanations, an understandable 
debate due to the Court’s unclear position.56 Some argued that it did not expand 
Constitutional rights or fundamental rights theory, but merely continued its logical 
extension of them; others, that “the role of the Court as guardian of individual rights 
[was] both solidified and advanced.”57 
Lacking a unified vision from the Court, legal scholars immediately post-
Griswold asserted that the scope of the right to privacy was relatively narrow.  Some 
surmised that a statute regulating the sale and manufacture of contraceptives would still 
be permissible under the newly articulated privacy.58 “It [was] conceivable that in future 
cases the Court [would] limit the doctrine to the marriage relationship, or even refuse to 
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extend it beyond the precise facts of the Connecticut case”59 University of Michigan Law 
School professor Paul G. Kauper noted that Griswold produced no major change in 
Constitutional theory and, consistent with Bill of Rights development at the time, merely 
takes the already in-place expansion of fundamental rights one small step further.  It was 
nothing revolutionary, but rather a reassertion of Court’s ability to protect fundamental 
rights.60 Other scholars, on the other hand, noted the potential for an expansive right of 
privacy, anticipating potential application of the privacy to sexual conduct outside of 
marriage, family planning, abortion, electronic eavesdropping, government subpoenas, 
search warrants and lie-detectors.61 
The analytical confusion scholars faced was a direct result of confusion within the 
Court.  Even the justices were unsure about privacy’s future applications.  Justice White 
argued that privacy was so vague and standardless as a right that it could be expanded or 
restricted at will.  He warned that Douglas’ opinion would inevitably endanger rather 
than strengthen the individual liberties explicitly enumerated in the Bill of Rights.62 
Also, Kauper notes that while the holding itself did little more than declare the 
Connecticut statute unconstitutional, its implications were great: 
The larger significance of the case, however, is the contribution, if any, that it 
makes to general constitutional theory respecting fundamental rights, the 
relationship of these rights to the specifics of the Bill of Rights, and the standard 
to be employed by the Court in passing on the constitutionality of legislation 
allegedly impinging on fundamental rights.63 
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Despite legal commentators’ disagreements about the implications of the holding, 
scholars agree that what resulted from Griswold was a legally, precedentially and 
theoretically ambiguous concept of privacy which had questionable grounding in the 
Constitution.  In 1965, legal theorist Robert D. McKay summarized the confusion well: 
Except for the fourth amendment holdings, the talk about privacy rights was not 
supported with judgments in vindication of privacy rights until Griswold…. The 
right of privacy is not to be limited narrowly to the facts of Griswold, but is meant 
to foretell broad protection for the dignity of man and the inviolability of his 
rights of personality….  Far more important than the result on the narrowly 
special facts of Griswold is the question whether the principle there announced 
can have these important collateral consequences.  It is certainly more than a bare 
possibility.64 
The Court struggled largely with privacy’s implications over the next eight years.  
By Roe v. Wade, it had churned meaning out of privacy in a number of areas.  The Court 
cited Griswold’s privacy principle in eighteen opinions in the period between Griswold 
and Roe. However, the majority did not consistently rely upon Griswold every time it 
might have been used.65 Particularly in light of its changing personnel, the Court was 
bitterly divided on the existence or derivation of a constitutional right to privacy.  What 
follows is a summary of the court cases which refer to the newly articulated right of 
privacy between Griswold and Roe.
Between the Landmarks 
Immediately following Griswold, the Court attempted to define privacy more 
specifically through case law.  In doing so, the Court generally contained its discussion of 
privacy to cases involving criminals and deviants: drunk drivers, corrupt officials, 
robbers, gamblers, gangsters, murderers, and sexual deviants.  This would become vital 
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in mobilizing public opinion during Roe v. Wade, as it was the first landmark case to link 
privacy rights and everyday wives and daughters.   
The Court saw its first opportunity to define privacy rights less than one year after 
Griswold. In Schmerber v. California (1966), the defendant was hospitalized after a 
drunk driving accident.  Medical personnel suspected that he was intoxicated, and a 
doctor took a urine sample and blood test without the patient’s consent, which police 
submitted as evidence.  Schmerber sued to suppress the evidence as a warrantless search, 
also claiming that his constitutional right to privacy had been violated.  In a 5-4 decision, 
the Court held that Schmerber’s constitutional rights were not violated and that the right 
to privacy did not apply to this situation.  Justice Douglas dissented on the grounds that 
the conviction violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
established in Griswold, and that the compulsory blood test clearly invaded the right of 
privacy protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.66 
Later that year, the Court heard a case regarding secret taping of private 
conversations.  In Osborn v. United States, a police officer submitted a tape recording of 
an attorney bribing a jury, taken while the office was undercover, without authorization 
from the District Court.  The attorney claimed his right to privacy had been violated.  The 
Court held in a 7-1 decision that no rights at all had been violated.  The majority based its 
opinion on the Fourth Amendment’s explicit permissions, neglecting to acknowledge any 
privacy emanations.  Again citing Griswold, however, Justice Douglas again dissented on 
the grounds that Osborn’s right to privacy as granted by the penumbra of the Bill of 
Rights was violated.  He expressed concern for the implications of the liberties the state 
took with Osborn: “We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, where everyone is 
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open to surveillance at all times; where there are no secrets from government. The 
aggressive breaches of privacy by the Government increase by geometric proportions. 
Wiretapping and ‘bugging’ run rampant, without effective judicial or legislative 
control.”67 
At this point, the Court had explicitly denied privacy rights in the Fourth 
Amendment field—searches, seizures and wiretapping.  However, Justice Douglas was 
quickly establishing a theme of unflinching support for the right to privacy, fearful about 
government infringements on individual rights.  When forced to evaluate one 
fundamental right over another, though, even Justice Douglas placed free speech 
protection above privacy protection.  In its next privacy case, the Court would deny 
privacy rights in the field of libel.   
 The following year, the Court heard Time, Inc. v. Hill.68 In this libel case, the 
plaintiff, a playwright and public figure, brought suit against Life magazine, claiming that 
the magazine had violated his right to privacy under New York law when it published a 
slanderous article about a personal family event.  A 6-3 Court held that because he was a 
public figure, the plaintiff relinquished some of his privacy rights and eventually 
remanded the decision to the lower court.  The majority and dissenting opinions agreed 
that the New York statute would not, in most cases, allow for infraction of freedom of 
speech, even at the expense of privacy rights.  This holding was consistent with the 
precedent set forth in New York Times v. Sullivan69 (1964), when the Court ruled that 
freedoms of speech and press allow publication of criticism of official conduct.   
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Criminal rights remained the most common place to see assertions of privacy.  In 
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden (1967), the Court again ruled against a 
plaintiff’s right to privacy.  In this suit, police chased a man suspected of armed robbery 
into his home and seized articles of his clothing while they were there to use as evidence 
against him. The Court held 8-1 that the evidence obtained in this manner without a 
warrant did not violate Bill of Rights or the suspect’s privacy.  Again, as the sole 
dissenter, Justice Douglas argued on the grounds that the suspect’s privacy had been 
violated:  
This right of privacy, sustained in Griswold, is akin to the right of privacy created 
by the Fourth Amendment. That there is a zone that no police can enter -- whether 
in ‘hot pursuit’ or armed with a meticulously proper warrant….  I would adhere to 
them and leave with the individual the choice of opening his private effects (apart 
from contraband and the like) to the police or keeping their contents a secret and 
their integrity inviolate. The existence of that choice is the very essence of the 
right of privacy.70 
Also in 1967, the Court heard Katz v. United States, the first case after Griswold in which 
the Court voted to grant personal privacy rights.  In this case, the defendant was 
convicted of transmitting wagering information via public telephone by evidence 
obtained with a wiretap on the public phone booth.  The tap was placed without a 
warrant.  Contrary to its previous trend, the Court held that such wiretapping was 
unconstitutional because one carries a right to privacy on his person rather than on his 
location.  This acknowledgement of a right to privacy stemmed only from the Fourth 
Amendment’s emanations and neglected the Fourteenth Amendment.  As the lone 
dissenter, Justice Black vehemently deplores the Court:  
Thus, by arbitrarily substituting the Court's language, designed to protect privacy,
for the Constitution's language, designed to protect against unreasonable searches 
 
70 Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
29
and seizures, the Court has made the Fourth Amendment its vehicle for holding 
all laws violative of the Constitution which offend the Court's broadest concept of 
privacy.71 
That the anti-privacy dissent cites a standard Court acknowledgement of privacy at least 
in the Fourth Amendment indicates a general consensus on the existence of privacy rights 
within the Constitution.  This indicates that the Court does acknowledge and seek to 
protect a right of privacy.  It had the opportunity to prove this support in a landmark case 
two years later.   
In Stanley v. Georgia (1969), the Court grappled with privacy and obscenity.  In 
this case, police obtained “obscene” material from the defendant’s apartment while in 
search of materials implicating him in bookmaking activity and arrested him for violating 
a Georgia statute prohibiting the possession of obscene materials.  In writing a unanimous 
opinion, Justice Marshall held that the statute violated First and Fourteenth Amendment 
protections of obscenity.  “For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very 
limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy.”  
Three justices concurred, holding that the seizure violated the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, but did not include a right to privacy argument.  Though, they did not deny 
the majority’s privacy argument, indicating a latent agreement with the opinion.72 This 
decision is still viewed as a groundbreaking event for privacy rights, as it was the first 
after Griswold in which every justice acknowledged an individual’s right to privacy.    
The Supreme Court saw a spike in privacy-related cases in 1971.  During this 
year, the Court faced multiple pressures to recognize privacy, particularly from Justice 
Douglas.  After the Court’s back-to-back pro-privacy decisions, it ruled consistently with 
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its previous warrantless search cases, and refused to extend its newly codified concept of 
privacy to a scenario in which they had previously denied it.  In Wyman, Commissioner 
of New York Department of Social Services v. James (1971), the defendant was denied 
government aid when she refused to allow a caseworker to visit her house.  She claimed 
the visit was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.  The Court ruled 
against her, and most importantly it articulated that the Fourth Amendment can exist as 
insurance against unreasonable searches and seizures but does not necessarily imply a 
fundamental right to privacy.73 
The Court followed up with another holding constraining privacy in United States 
v. Vuitch (1971).  Here, the plaintiff challenged a District of Columbia statute making it 
illegal to receive an abortion unless continuing the pregnancy would result in harm to the 
mother.  While the majority intimated that the lower courts did not give close enough 
scrutiny to the statute based on precedent set forth by Griswold and refused to consider 
abortion a privacy issue, Justice Douglas dissented, stating that “[a]bortion touches 
intimate affairs of the family, of marriage, of sex, which in Griswold v. Connecticut, we 
held to involve rights associated with several express constitutional rights and which are 
summed up in ‘the right of privacy.’”74 He was ahead of his time in his opinion, taking 
stand in a position the Court would soon follow.    
 Again, in Palmer  v. Thompson, Mayor of the City of Jackson  (1971), in which 
Justice Douglas argued for privacy, the Court ignored the contentious idea.  After federal 
litigation had declared unconstitutional a Mississippi town operating four swimming 
pools for whites and one for blacks, the town closed every swimming pool.  Black 
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plaintiffs sued for the town to reopen desegregated pools.  The opinion was devoid of 
mention of privacy or Griswold save for Justice Douglas’s dissent, which does not 
embrace a privacy argument but nonetheless states: “Thus the right of privacy, which we 
honored in Griswold, may not be overturned by a majority vote at the polls, short of a 
constitutional amendment.”75 By this time, Justice Douglas had begun to see privacy at 
every turn, whenever rights were implicated, seemingly, including in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.   
 When the Court issued its opinion for Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), it 
recognized (though did not employ) a right to privacy for only the third time since 
Griswold. In this case, a murder suspect’s wife turned over his guns and clothing without 
knowing her husband was being investigated for murder.  The police used the evidence to 
gain a warrant from a biased magistrate, and confiscated the accused’s vehicle, using it as 
evidence gain the eventual conviction.  Though the majority did not rely on privacy in its 
opinion, it held that because the magistrate was biased, the evidence was impermissible.  
In the dissent, though, Chief Justice Warren introduces privacy. “The broad, abstract, and 
ambiguous concept of ‘privacy’ is now unjustifiably urged as a comprehensive substitute 
for the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’”76 
regarding the Court’s skewed interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 
 In 1972, the Court faced Eisenstadt v. Baird. In a key holding, the majority 
overturned the conviction of a Connecticut man who distributed contraceptives without a 
doctor’s license.  The majority first stated that privacy is not applied to a married couple 
as an independent unit, but rather to each individual within the couple.  The opinion 
 
75 Palmer et al. v. Thompson, Mayor of the City of Jackson, et. al, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
76 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
32
concluded with the memorable statement, “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear 
or beget a child [italics in original].”77 Privacy’s shift from applying to a married couple 
or a family to an individual person was an extremely important precedent.  It set the stage 
for a discussion of privacy rights as applicable to both individual partners within a 
marriage.  This enabled discussion of women’s and men’s independent privacy rights.  In 
other words, while the Court maintained a relatively closed approach to privacy in the 
years following Griswold, this opinion opened the door for a much broader range of 
applications—like abortion.   
In 1973 when the Court faced its last pre-Roe privacy-related case, the Court 
again turned its back on the emerging right.  Couch v. United States involved a 
restaurateur whose accountant refused to disclose her tax records during an IRS 
investigation, and, after receiving a summons, transferred the documents to an attorney.  
The restaurateur claimed disclosing her private documents would be incriminating and 
was therefore free from doing so under the Fifth Amendment.  The Supreme Court 
upheld her conviction on the grounds that once she gave up her taxes to an accountant, 
she forfeited her rights to privacy and against self-incrimination; the transfer from 
accountant to attorney was void as it had transpired after the state issued its summons.  
The two dissenters, including Justice Douglas maintained that one’s privacy extends to 
himself, his property and his documents; it protects people rather than places based on the 
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Fourth Amendment.78 Following is an analysis of the cases and their impact on privacy 
principles.   
 
Privacy Defined 
The Warren Court Fumbles the Concept 
Immediately following the legally muddled and doctrinally confused Griswold, 
and with the Griswold membership of the Court still intact, the Court had the opportunity 
to more clearly articulate its position on privacy.  In the year following the Griswold 
opinion, the Court issued two decisions denying the potentially vast extensions of privacy 
rights.  Despite its liberal tendencies, it took a rather strict constructionist approach, 
refusing to acknowledge penumbras and emanations, and instead granted only those 
rights expressly enumerated in the Bill of Rights.  Justice Douglas dissented on privacy 
grounds, even though the majority opinion did not engage the idea of privacy.  It was not 
until late 1967 when a majority opinion again applied the Griswold privacy principle to 
protect an entire person and his or her conversations, rather than a place.79 While this 
was not a direct claim to a right to privacy, it reinforced that the Fourth Amendment 
created a zone of privacy.  By the time the Court issued its Katz opinion, it had 
appropriated the “right of privacy” as defined by Griswold v. Connecticut into the regular 
syntax of its opinions.  It was no longer a parenthetical remark, off-handed citation or 
footnote reference.  While Justice Douglas incorporated the right to privacy in his 
previous dissents, this was the first case in which the right to privacy was a central 
argument for both the majority and the dissent.  In other words, Court members did not 
discuss the emanations from the Bill of Rights, but instead engaged privacy directly.  The 
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existence of a right to privacy was no longer in question; the question remained, however, 
as to how to define and apply it since in these cases, the Court had neither defined 
privacy nor set a uniform standard by which it could be applied. 
Interestingly, earlier that year in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court argued that the 
defendant, a public personality, had a right to privacy but that it had not been violated.  
Perhaps because the Court did not have to defend or define the defendant’s privacy right, 
but merely stated that it existed but was not violated, it was easier to include in the 
opinion as fundamental.  
 
The Burger Court Attempts a Retreat 
When Chief Justice Warren announced his intent to retire in 1968, the Court had 
already seen four cases which acknowledged privacy in some way.  Warren hoped to 
continue this trend. Suspecting that Richard Nixon would become the next President of 
the United States, and hoping for a liberal replacement, Chief Justice Earl Warren 
announced his intent to retire while Lyndon B. Johnson was still in office.  It was not to 
be.  Johnson’s nomination of his friend, Abe Fortas, stalled in the election-year politics of 
1968; presidential-hopeful Richard Nixon went to great lengths to ensure that Fortas was 
not confirmed as Chief Justice.  Nixon and his political cohorts initiated a mudslinging 
campaign about “cronyism” between Fortas and then President Lyndon Johnson.  When 
Fortas was not approved to the position, Johnson tried several other routes, but Nixon and 
his followers thwarted them all.  In fact, during his presidential campaign, Nixon 
explicitly stated that as President he would appoint strict constructionist judges and ones 
who would not “encroach on areas belonging to Congress and the President,” and that he 
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wanted to restore order to the United States.80 As a result, Johnson’s presidency ended 
before he could successfully install a new Chief Justice. 
After Nixon was elected, he continued to make his intentions for the Court 
explicit.  In his 1968 presidential acceptance speech, he stated:  
Tonight it’s time for some honest talk about the problem of order in the United 
States.  Let us always respect, as I do, our courts and those who serve on them, 
but let us also recognize that some of our courts in their decisions have gone too 
far in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in this country.81 
Leaving little room for misinterpretation, Nixon publicly announced his goals for the new 
Supreme Court.  Despite this, Earl Warren still intended to retire; he issued his official 
letter of resignation in 1969 during Nixon’s first term as president, giving Nixon his first 
chance to realize his vision of a stricter, more conservative court. 
Nixon nominated Warren Burger, a judge from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.  
Nixon saw Burger as the ringmaster to lead a counterrevolution against Warren’s liberal 
policies.  He was a renowned dissenter on the “famously liberal” United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia.  Perhaps in response to the judicial and political 
mayhem during Johnson’s lame duck period, Congress approved Burger with only three 
dissenting votes.   
Responding to the “cronyism” scandal, Justice Fortas announced his retirement 
later in 1969.  After two failed appointees, Nixon discovered what he thought a suitable 
candidate.  Harry Blackmun was a longtime friend of Warren Burger and a judge on the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Blackmun was moderate on civil rights, conservative 
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on criminal rights and civil liberties, and an advocate of judicial restraint and 
conservativism.82 
In 1971, Justices Black and Harlan also announced their retirements, and Nixon 
had two more opportunities to appoint his ideal justice.  Of the two, Black was a stronger 
liberal and supporter of privacy rights, while Harlan was a voice of conservativism and 
opponent of privacy rights.  Nixon first appointed and had confirmed William Rehnquist, 
a staunch conservative, segregationist, and strict constructionist.  The Senate also 
confirmed Lewis Powell, a more moderate conservative who supported gradual change 
and did not support civil rights orcivil liberties leaders.83 During Nixon’s first three years 
in office, then, three consistent liberals and supporters of privacy rights and one 
conservative had been replaced by four conservatives who were thought to be opponents 
of a broad conception of personal liberties. 
Many scholars agree that Burger’s court provided a more closed version of 
Warren’s policies.  It was stronger on law and order issues and was much less apt to grant 
liberties without clear constitutional, precedential, or doctrinal grounding.  However, one 
legal analyst disagrees.   
There has indeed been change [in the Court’s direction].  However, the 
importance of maintaining earlier rulings has been under-estimated, areas of 
noticeable continuity have been missed, and areas where the Burger Court has 
advanced along the paths first marked by Earl Warren and his brethren have been 
set aside.  Growth has been ignored, while the amount of erosion has been played 
up.84 
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The trend of reproductive privacy rights showed particular certainty.  Privacy would not 
be extended into criminal areas, to be sure, but the Burger Court remained relatively 
consistent with the Warren Court’s acceptance of sexual privacy cases (sexual and 
marital privacy, reproductive freedoms, and obscenity) into its docket.  The Burger Court 
focused on pulling back on criminal rights, asserting its position as a “law and order” 
court,85 but Nixon’s ambitions were only partially realized.  This “law and order” Court 
would eventually open the flood gates for public confusion and turmoil regarding its 
privacy rulings as evidenced by the cases citing the Griswold privacy precedent.  As the 
Court refused to hand down an overarching definition of privacy, it dealt with each issue 
independently.  It handled each issue as it came up rather than upholding a vague and 
unenforceable sweeping definition.  It predicated its decisions on the particular 
circumstances or issues within a case.  Still, the Court was reticent to extend the right of 
privacy to criminals and deviants.  The majority of privacy-related cases it took into its 
docket dealt with criminals and deviants, but despite Justice Douglas’ ability to see 
privacy issues in myriad other cases, the majority frequently acknowledged its existence 
but denied its relevance.   
Nonetheless, all of the cases dealing with privacy issues between Griswold and 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire cite Griswold as the legal foundation for fundamental 
privacy.  Despite that a right of privacy was not explicitly written into the Constitution, 
the Griswold opinion was the first to give it legal salience in the Bill of Rights.  But by 
the time the Court issued its opinion on Coolidge v. New Hampshire, it had stopped citing 
Griswold and simply relied on the common understanding that privacy was a 
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fundamental right.  That common understanding would be taken to an extreme in Roe v. 
Wade and Doe v. Bolton (1973).   
 
Roe v. Wade 
Very soon after Griswold there emerged a clear debate about what a right to 
privacy in contraception meant for abortion services.   Pre-Roe scholars debated whether 
the privacy argument initiated by Griswold would hold water in the abortion debate.86 
Cyril Means, a key participant in the formation of the Roe argument stated, “no 
Griswold-style constitutional challenge to abortion statutes had any credible chance of 
success….  Judges are much more likely to accept a historical argument” than any 
privacy-oriented reasoning that a woman’s individual choice was a fundamental liberty.87 
However, in the late 1960s when Planned Parenthood, the National Organization for 
Women (NOW), and the American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) Association for the 
Study of Abortions (ASA) began formulating the ideal abortion case (as Planned 
Parenthood had done with Griswold), privacy was a key feature of their thinking, but it 
was still not treated as a fundamental right.   
Later, in 1969 after the Hot Springs ASA conference, obstetrics and gynecology 
professor Edmund Overstreet stated that Griswold “is being quoted increasingly 
frequently as a manifesto which points the right of the individual woman to decide 
against pregnancy even though abortion is involved.”88 That same year, Norma 
McCorvey, a poor, unwed pregnant woman sought an abortion in Texas.  Her physician 
refused to help her under a Texas statute prohibiting abortions, and after visiting a Dallas 
 
86 Garrow, D. J. (1994). Liberty and sexuality : the right to privacy and the making of Roe v. Wade. New 
York; New York: Macmillan Pub. Co., 350-6. 
87 Ibid, 357. 
88 Ibid, 358. 
39
abortion clinic which McCorvey felt was dangerous, she sought legal help.  McCorvey 
became Jane Roe, and her attorneys brought the class action suit Roe et al. v. Wade to the 
Supreme Court. 
Despite that the Court in Vuitch refused to consider any privacy arguments based 
on Griswold, Roe attorneys, with little insight as to how the Court would accept a similar 
argument brought under different circumstances, still brought the case under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s implicit right to privacy. 89 Medical organizations like the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists filed amicus briefs emphasizing 
the association and privacy rights a woman has with her doctor.  Planned Parenthood and 
the American Public Health Association also filed briefs advocating a privacy-centered 
abortion defense.90 
Particularly interesting are the ways in which litigants brought privacy arguments 
before the Court and the ways in which the Court applied them.  The Roe attorneys 
centered their arguments on Douglas’ “penumbras” theory articulated in Griswold; they 
tried to base it in as many amendments as they could, including the First, Fourth, Fifth, 
Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth.  First, the First Amendment protects one’s freedom to 
associate with whomever she chooses, including her physician.  Next, attorneys 
Weddington and Coffee argued that limiting abortion rights invades the woman’s and 
physician’s rights to privacy in the medical office, as protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.  Also citing Griswold, the attorneys further asserted that the Fifth 
Amendment’s creation of zones of privacy protected women’s bodies from government 
intrusion.  Further, the attorneys strayed from the Griswold outline and included a 
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“poignant” defense in the Eighth Amendment, arguing that denying a woman an abortion 
was cruel and unusual punishment.  Despite their reticence about using an unfamiliar 
Ninth Amendment argument, Coffee and Weddington also cited Justices Douglas and 
Goldberg’s use of the Ninth Amendment to create a general right to privacy.  
Interestingly, the two attorneys acknowledged the argument that denying a woman’s right 
to control and privacy over her body was denying her life, liberty and property under the 
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but omitted it from their oral 
arguments.  They chose instead to use it as a fall back contestation.91 
Scholars agree that the oral arguments in Roe did very little to influence the 
justices’ decisions.  Likely, they had formulated their opinions before the case was heard.  
The principal question was one which the justices had already considered.  The justices 
had only to decide in which Amendment they would ground their opinions.92 Similar to 
Griswold, the Court based its legal reasoning in many different places.  The Court held 
that “a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does 
exist under the Constitution.”93 Because this core principle was clear, Roe was written 
and signed by all the liberal justices and three of Nixon’s prized conservative appointees.  
Writing the opinion of the Court, Blackmun found the right to privacy inherent in two 
places.  First, he saw it in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty 
derived from the Due Process Clause.  Second, he found it the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth 
Amendments, though he never explicitly states where the concept actually exists.  
Essentially, the heart and soul of Blackmun’s opinion lies in his statement that the right to 
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privacy may be found somewhere, but wherever it is, “it is broad enough to encompass a 
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.”94 Ultimately, he intimates 
that the existence of a right to privacy is not in question, eradicating Griswold’s 
skepticism about the existence of the right, at all.  Only Justices White and Rehnquist 
dissented, on two grounds.  First, White and Rehnquist argued that abortion laws should 
be left to the states.  Second, without addressing the existence of a right to privacy, White 
complained that “the court had simply announced a new right without scarcely any 
reason or authority for its action.” He does not deny privacy, but instead criticized the 
means by which the majority acknowledged the right.  Rehnquist also responded, “the 
privacy right in Roe, whatever its dimensions, had little or nothing in common with the 
Court’s earlier privacy cases.”  Like White, Rehnquist does not deny the existence of a 
right to privacy, but rather that it was misapplied in this case.   
What resulted from the holding was that the vision of privacy set forth in Roe was 
significantly expanded from the one asserted in Griswold.95 One legal scholar at the time 
stated that Roe clearly was “at least far more explicit than Griswold in its protection of 
the autonomy interest in privacy.”96 Implicit in the words of Griswold was the notion 
that legislation regulating or prohibiting the sale and manufacture of contraceptives 
would be permissible.  In Roe, however, the Court elevated privacy to the level 
requisitioning strict scrutiny, asserting that the states must have a compelling interest in 
infringing upon privacy rights.  That is to say, however restrained the Burger court was in 
other areas, it was nearly as activist as the Warren court when it came to reproductive 
privacy.  The Burger Court produced, in Roe v. Wade, a 7-2 opinion in favor of a solid 
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and unambiguous right to privacy.  It now had judicial support, significant policy content, 
and implications beyond the curious law invalidated in Griswold.
Conclusion 
This development would prove to be essential in the solidification of privacy 
rights in the 1970s.  Because privacy gained a strong foothold in legal thought during the 
decade following Griswold, it gathered significant momentum in the greater social and 
political discourse, with Roe v. Wade as the catalyst that thrust Court-conceived privacy 
into the mainstream.  While non-legal discussions largely neglected the legal conceptions 
of privacy, Constitutional privacy remained a constant force, chipping away at the 
retaining wall that kept back the flood of privacy understanding, activity, regulation, and 
discussion.  That privacy had become solidified in one branch of America contributed to 
its strength to break the dam in later years.   
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Chapter 3: The Johnson Administration  
Though the Court after 1965 was toying with its newly minted legal concept of 
privacy, that right was still misunderstood and occasionally ignored in other areas of 
society, particularly during President Johnson’s administration.  Yet, other conceptions of 
privacy remained latent in the undercurrents and deeper consciousness of America.  This 
chapter details the political and social development of privacy during Johnson’s term in 
the White House as a part of a wider attempt to account for the multi-layered codification 
of privacy in later years.  It was during this time that privacy began to emerge as a 
political issue as well as a legal one,97 although it was emerging out of an ambiguous 
concept that was as difficult for the Court to articulate as it was to regulate.  While it 
might seem that privacy would easily delineate into simple origins and foundational 
principles, its pre-1970 history was actually quite complex.  It would be difficult to credit 
any one event or agency with “starting” to break the privacy dam in American society; 
cracks seemed to surface from many points at the same time.  However muddled, these 
intertwined developments are essential to help understand the flood of privacy in the 
public and political eye during later years.   
While the Court sat in one corner intrigued by its new conceptual tool, the elected 
branches were awakening to its possibilities.  Each handled privacy in a way that dealt 
almost exclusively with criminals and deviants.  The President took advantage of the 
technological advances that allowed him to gain political leverage by spying on his 
opponents and political enemies, but publicly he championed personal privacy 
protections.  Congress intensified its committee work to calm the rumblings of 
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discontentment with spying and information collection.  The media, for its part, helped by 
the executive and legislative branches, covered privacy developments, reacted to events, 
and provoked awareness and activity.  Each equally-footed player slowly expanded their 
individual cracks.  By the end of Johnson’s presidency, these cracks would begin to 
coalesce, ready to crumble before the concept of personal privacy.   
In the last corner sat the Federal Bureau of Investigation, unfazed by the political 
concept.  When the FBI transformed in 1956, from an institution working to protect the 
public from communism into a seemingly out-of-control agency that was endangering 
public peace and security by breaching assumed rules of privacy, privacy rose from the 
depths of social awareness and into the limelight.  If not for the radical and superfluous 
FBI investigations, it would be difficult to see a substantial first crack in the privacy 
issue.   
That is, while Johnson entered the presidency with some concern about personal 
privacy, his political eye began to shift toward it both by invading it and working to 
protect it, but only after the FBI began wielding its investigatory power in a manner that 
alarmed Johnson, Congress and the media.  From Johnson’s response to the FBI, the 
media ran away with perceived governmental intrusions on the public’s privacy.  
Congress responded contemporaneously by organizing committees, conducting hearings 
and proposing legislation to protect individuals’ privacy.  Once Congress published its 
committee hearing findings and began to speak out against privacy infringements, the 
public became more concerned.  In response to the public’s concern, President Johnson 
and Congress strengthened their work to protect personal privacy, creating an upward 
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spiral of privacy discourse.  In other words, what began as a powerful federal agency 
using its power to invade domestic privacy eventually became a national political issue. 
It seems, interestingly, that different groups were concerned with different aspects 
of privacy.  The general public was becoming more aware of privacy because of its fears 
of electronic intrusions from the government.  The average man was most concerned that 
his phone conversations were being listened to.  The government, on the other hand, was 
more attuned to it because of its limited ability to act against criminals, which conflicted 
with its desire to match public outcry against eavesdropping and tapping.  It could not be 
strict on law and order while frivolously granting privacy rights.  The Supreme Court was 
becoming more aware of privacy largely because of its legal ambiguity in sexuality and 
marriage cases.  While Congress and the public were more concerned with the salient 
privacy issues that affected everyday people, the Court was concerned with its obfuscated 
version of privacy, centering on intrusive statutes that were rarely enforced and were 
therefore not a source of public concern.  This multidirectional dialog played 
significantly into gaining privacy national force in later years.   
 
Privacy Invaders: The Federal Bureau of Instigation 
As far back as the 1920s, a handful of government agencies had used various 
mechanisms such as illegal wiretaps to combat perceived threats to American stability.  
With the rise of new technologies like wiretaps and computers, numerous government 
agencies began collecting and cataloging information on employees, other government 
agents, and regular citizens.  The more aggressive investigators included the Treasury 
Department, the IRS, and the Post Office.  Yet, with its increasing autonomy and power, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was responsible for the worst intrusions on 
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citizens’ private information.  Its autonomy and extensive use of surveillance both 
exploited Americans’ fears.  First, the domestic enemy of crime had increased in America 
after World War II leading to political demand for protection.  Second, the external threat 
both took advantage of Americans’ fears and led many to desire more zealous FBI action.  
Due to the prowess of FBI director and public relations genius J. Edgar Hoover, the 
public was particularly enamored with the FBI, which would enjoy decades of clout as 
the front-line defense against both threats.   
Congress initially handled these matters.  But, by the early 1950s, internal 
security and investigation matters were “to be removed from political, and particularly 
legislative, arenas….”98 An executive pronouncement known as The Truman Directive 
explicitly granted the FBI control of “investigative work in matters relating to espionage, 
sabotage, subversive activities and related matters,”99 but did not define any of these 
terms.  The FBI took the directive as a go ahead for drastic internal security measures and 
intrusions on Americans’ privacy.100 Initially the public supported this behavior.  Hoover 
acted as a guardian and was politically savvy in crafting his public message by 
emphasizing that the elected had the power to “curb crime by getting tough,” and that the 
Supreme Court and the Justice Department were to blame for the increase in crime.”101 
To be sure, Hoover used sophisticated strategies.  He encouraged the public to view his 
activities as patriotic and politically impartial, claiming to protect their personal 
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privacy.102 Interestingly, the American Civil Liberties Union initially supported this 
power transfer.  Communism, it felt, was more of a threat to civil liberties than FBI 
power.  As such, ubiquitous fear of communism prohibited any widespread critique of 
investigation practices.   
In addition to relinquishing its investigation duties, Congress designated 
additional resources for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  However, as the FBI began 
to adopt unscrupulous or illegal investigation practices, Congress became worried that it 
would begin to infringe on citizens’ First Amendment rights.  Soon after, Congress cut 
many of its ties with FBI; meanwhile, the FBI increased its vigor in seeking out spies and 
Communists.103 The FBI’s prowess and relentlessness was successful largely due to J. 
Edgar Hoover, who could exact such loyalty because, during the 1950s and 1960s, there 
was no outside review of his policies.104 By 1964, one author has argued, the FBI could 
be said to have “passed through and beyond the model of a political police,” viewing 
itself as responsible for “disrupting the activities of indigenous American groups, in 
particular, the Ku Klux Klan, that had no connection either to the Communist party or to 
the agency of a foreign power.”105 
For example, their “Cointelpro” (counterintelligence program) mission was total 
reporting of financial information, phone records, and political affiliations, amongst other 
things.  Cointelpro was based only on the approval of the FBI director, and operated 
without congressional oversight.  The FBI was also adamant about demonstrating its 
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discoveries under Cointelpro.  For example, it sent anonymous postcards to 6,000 Klan 
members stating such things as, “Klansman, trying to hide your identity behind your 
sheet?  You received this—someone knows who you are.”106 What’s more, Hoover also 
turned on the labor movement, African Americans and pro-civil rights groups contending 
that “The infiltration, exploitation, and control of the Negro population has long been a 
[Communist] party goal and is one of its principal goals today.”107 
Autonomy had other forms.  For example, the FBI exempted itself from rules and 
regulations of the Civil Service Commission, an agency intended to arbitrate and oversee 
the public sector.  The FBI would occasionally leak information to the press and fabricate 
stories to further its agenda.  As it took increasingly extralegal approaches to 
investigations, the FBI’s infractions became egregious: spying, ordering wiretaps on 
anyone, particularly government and high profile officials, and taking records without 
consent or knowledge.  Thus, “it was only a matter of time before liberals and their 
sometime friends—like Senator Sam J. Ervin [D., N.C.]—with strict constitutionalist 
leanings would recognize the new internal security environment and take steps to contain 
it.”108 
By the end of the 1960s, the FBI had immunized itself from outside scrutiny with 
blackmail and unscrupulous practices.  Hoover flatly refused to turn over FBI records to 
the National Archives and destroyed many other records.  The FBI was also having 
trouble retaining employees because of the nature of the personal and private information 
it kept on them.  Despite the great lengths Hoover took to ensure that details of the FBI’s 
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behavior were not leaked to the news media, stating that information needed to remain 
confidential to protect citizens’ personal privacy,109 major national news media 
publications picked up on this behavior.  The enormous amount of illegal surveillance 
came to the public light when an illegal investigate government agencies FBI bug was 
discovered in a Las Vegas gambler’s office.  “This led to a series of court-ordered 
revelations of illegal federal surveillance involving some 50 or more cases,”110 which set 
back federal surveillance practices until Richard Nixon took over the White House.  The 
Nation bluntly but not inaccurately stated: “Under Hoover’s administration the FBI has 
assumed practically unlimited investigative powers.  It can investigate almost anyone it 
wants to investigate, by almost any methods it sees fit.”111 
As the press tapped into FBI misbehavior, the FBI became vulnerable to political 
attack.  First, it could exercise hegemony over internal security matters only as long as it 
maintained its liberal constituency.  But as the relationship with its liberal allies eroded, 
so too did its staying power.  Second, its staying power depended on controlling and 
keeping its files secret from the public eye; as long as the public did not know what they 
were doing, they were free to do it.  When these files were leaked to the mass media, its 
insularity was impaired.  Last, the agency’s reputation was closely tied to its director.  
When the public began to see Hoover as a threat rather than a protector, it also turned on 
the FBI.    
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By 1968, the FBI had decreased its investigations and dossiers.  Three factors had 
influenced Hoover’s decision to curtail his surveillance and intrusive behavior.  First, 
Hoover had become such an outlier in the Justice Department that he was pushed into 
compliance with the department’s pressure.  Second, the 1968 Crime bill provided that 
FBI directors after Hoover would have to be appointed by the president and approved by 
the Senate.112 Last, “shifts in legal and public opinion made it more dangerous for the 
Bureau to continue many intelligence-gathering methods of the past….”113 With Hoover 
and the FBI seeming to shape up, the government would at last have the unobstructed 
ability to act on these new privacy issues.  
 
An Unusual Relationship:  LBJ’s Duality  
If anyone in a position of power was aware of the FBI’s practices, it was President 
Lyndon B. Johnson.  During this time, Johnson also engaged dishonest behavior.  While 
he publicly urged more protections for citizens’ privacy, he was eavesdropping and 
snooping behind closed doors.  While he was vice-president, Johnson was told “more 
government secrets than any of his predecessors,”114 and used the willing FBI for 
political espionage.  Like some of his predecessors, “he comfortably used it to gain 
information on other rivals…;”115 he requested and received over twelve hundred files 
concerning the activities of his political foes.116 
112 Powers, R. G. (1987). Secrecy and power : the life of J. Edgar Hoover. New York; London: Free Press; 
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Johnson also sought to appear strict on criminal justice and promote an 
atmosphere of law and order, which complicated his stance on privacy.  This interesting 
duality resulted in part from Johnson’s unique relationship with J. Edgar Hoover.  The 
two were close friends.  Johnson commissioned Hoover to “covertly—and, of course, 
illegally,”117 investigate threats of communism and to the safety of him and his family.  
Though Hoover worked to protect Johnson, he also gathered blackmail material on 
Johnson.118 Therefore, Hoover had the power both to protect LBJ from physical harm 
and political mudslinging, and to destroy LBJ.  Johnson did not leave this power 
unchecked.  His awareness of Hoover’s illegal behavior gave him leverage against 
Hoover.  One scholar puts it simply: “Johnson and Hoover seem to have developed a 
cozy, though uneasy, relationship: two men of power courting, exploiting, and 
mistrusting each other.”119 This would create yet another leak of privacy issues and, 
eventually, the scandal that broke the dam.   
 LBJ also privately condoned the FBI’s investigations of the Ku Klux Klan, but 
publicly opposed them.  To the public, the only reason for an invasion of privacy was to 
protect society from deviants and criminals.  A series of incidents portrayed LBJ to the 
public as a pillar of personal privacy protections.  In 1964, President Johnson defended 
congressional action to investigate government agencies and in 1965 he announced a ban 
on federal agencies wiretapping without a warrant.  Also in 1965, Johnson issued several 
memoranda expressing his distaste for eavesdropping and his firm commitment to the 
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right of privacy.120 Additionally, at new Attorney General Ramsey Clark’s induction, 
Johnson departed from his prepared text to highlight their mutual determination to end 
governmental wiretapping and eavesdropping, stating, “Every man should know that his 
conversations, his correspondence and his personal life are truly private.”121 Two years 
later in his State of the Union address, Johnson recited a well-received passage: “We 
should protect what Justice Brandeis called the ‘right most valued by civilized men’ – the 
right of privacy.  We should outlaw all wire-tapping—public and private—wherever and 
whenever it occurs, except when the security of the nation is at stake—and only then with 
the strictest safeguards.”122 Congress and the public were fairly quick to respond to 
Johnson’s encouragement of privacy protections, but the media, now aware of his 
hypocrisy regarding privacy intrusions, honed in on them.  The grave FBI privacy 
infractions compiled with executive abuses of power prompted significant media 
attention.  Johnson’s personal investigations and public façade advocating privacy 
protection sent mixed signals from the White House on how exactly the rest of the 
country should approach invasions of privacy.  Once the press became more heavily 
involved, it left little room for further public confusion, forming yet another crack in the 
privacy dam. 
 
The Media 
Elite authors, intellectuals, and journalists have sometimes seen more clearly, and 
earlier than others, the privacy issues at stake in their future.  Already in 1948, George 
Orwell foretold of a world under constant surveillance from the government and 
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consigned to the futility of resisting “Big Brother.”123 In Orwell’s wake, writers 
published a litany of books and articles exploring privacy.  While few foresaw a world as 
extreme as Orwell’s, technology and privacy were represented in a “literature of alarm” 
that was instrumental in placing these issues into the public’s imagination.  These works 
included fiction like Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1966), and non-fiction books 
like Samuel Dash, Richard Schwartz, and Robert Knowlton’s The Eavesdroppers (1959),
Myron Brenton’s The Privacy Invaders (1964), Vance Packard’s The Naked Society 
(1965), Alan Westin’s Privacy and Freedom (1967), and Jerry Rosenberg’s The Death of 
Privacy (1969), to name a few, greatly increased the public’s fear of privacy invasions.124 
Prolific privacy writer, Alan F. Westin in particular became a main propagator in 
publicizing privacy intrusions and an instigator of privacy protection movements.   
By the end of the 1960s, these themes reached the wider audiences of television.  
Documentary programs, such as ABC’s “Big Brother is Listening,” and NBC’s “The Big 
Ear,” and PBS’s “Bugging in the Automobile World,” “Telephones and Intercoms,” and 
“Out in the Open, But Not Safe,” highlighted the many ways in which citizens’ privacy 
were being violated by private bodies and the government.125 While there was previous 
published opposition to privacy rights, it was largely grounded in esoteric academic and 
governmental language and did not actualize the public’s fears of a 1984 type world.  
Rather, it largely circulated amongst academics and media elites, the majority of whom 
already supported personal privacy protections.  Television programs and literature 
helped raise general public awareness of privacy intrusions, and another crack formed in 
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the privacy dam.  The percentage of the American public that was familiar with or aware 
of wiretapping rose from less than 30% in 1944 to more than 60 percent in 1966. 126 
Interest groups like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) published 
materials to promote open dialogue about privacy policy.  The ACLU worked with 
computer and technology experts in the field of personal information privacy, and 
worked mostly with other civil liberties advocates during the debates about passage of a 
particular section of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 dealing 
with privacy rights.  However, because these issues remained on the congressional 
agenda for years, the ACLU’s evidence did not offer an open-and-shut case.  There was 
still clear opposition to the ACLU’s position.127 
The news media continued to contribute to raising public awareness of 
eavesdropping and wiretapping.  Interestingly, these opinions spanned the entire 
spectrum of American political involvement, from the Nation, the New Republic, and the 
New York Post, on the left to H.L. Hunt’s Life Line, U.S. News and World Report, and the 
National Review on the right.  The threat of federal invasion of privacy brought liberals 
and conservatives to a common position.128 Westin surveyed more than 300 newspaper 
editorials on electronic eavesdropping and privacy during 1964-66, finding virtually 
unanimous agreement that “control measures were needed and that both private and 
public-official eavesdropping had reached proportions unbearable for a free society.”129 
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Contemporary databases make further inquiry into media coverage of privacy 
both feasible and illuminating.  I performed an additional study of attention given by the 
New York Times to privacy was an historical news search of New York Times articles in 
which three directions.  First, the appearance of the phrase “right to privacy” or “right of 
privacy” in the citation, document text, or abstract of articles every month between 
January 1, 1965 and January 1, 1975 was searched.130 Second, the articles were scanned 
for relevancy, discounting any biographies of individuals that mention the individual’s 
love of privacy, for example.  Last, the number of times the pertinent articles appeared on 
the front page of the newspaper and also noted the length of the articles were noted.   
 The study was repeated, but searched for the appearance of the word “privacy” in 
the citation or abstract. A content analysis was performed to ensure relevancy to the 
study.  The study was repeated one more time, but searched for the phrase “right to 
privacy” or “right of privacy” in the citation or abstract during the same time period.  A 
content analysis was also performed in this study, but based on the search criteria, no 
articles needed omission.  The results below discuss press coverage of privacy between 
1965 and 1970, roughly while the Johnson administration policies were taking place. 
 
130 The phrase “classified ad” was excluded form all searches. 
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Quarter 
Number of Articles with 
“Right to Privacy” or 
“Right of Privacy” in text 
Number of Articles with 
“Right to Privacy” or 
“Right of Privacy” in 
Citation or Abstract 
Number of Articles with 
"Privacy" in abstract or 
citation 
Jan-Mar 1965 17 2 15
Apr-Jun 1965 25 2 13
Jul-Sep 1965 25 0 9
Oct-Dec 1965 19 3 16
Jan-Mar 1966 11 1 6
Apr-Jun 1966 17 1 12
Jul-Sep 1966 16 1 13
Oct-Dec 1966 29 2 13
Jan-Mar 1967 22 2 14
Apr-Jun 1967 18 1 16
Jul-Sep 1967 15 0 11
Oct-Dec 1967 20 1 15
Jan-Mar 1968 24 1 16
Apr-Jun 1968 25 1 8
Jul-Sep 1968 17 1 11
Oct-Dec 1968 15 0 7
Jan-Mar 1969 19 3 15
Apr-Jun 1969 21 1 14
Jul-Sep 1969 15 0 7
Oct-Dec 1969 33 3 10
The results of this study bear significantly on privacy’s chronological 
development within different aspects of the government and society.  Attention given 
strictly to “right to privacy” issues markedly increased between 1965 and 1975.  While 
newspaper articles mentioning privacy in the early 1960s dealt largely with ad hoc issues 
of privacy in foreign countries, biographies of people who “loved their right to privacy,” 
and the “right to privacy” in real estate sales, as privacy became more of an issue both 
publicly and in the courts, the newspapers depicted the shift by focusing their privacy 
articles on the Court and the government’s treatment of privacy.  Interestingly, the New 
York Times articles approached privacy mainly from a security from wiretapping and 
eavesdropping angle, and tended only to deal with marital/reproductive privacy in an 
Table 3.1—New York Times Privacy Coverage per Quarter: 1965-1969 
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abortion context.  There was very little printed about the right to marital privacy or 
familial privacy.   
New York Times articles addressing the “right to privacy” or the “right of privacy” 
delineate into five major thematic categories—marital privacy, familial privacy, 
eavesdropping and wiretapping, obscenity, courts and individual states, the first three of 
which emerged chronologically.  The latter two appeared regularly throughout the time 
period.  First, articles covered marital privacy, which was likely a response to Griswold.
This trend was short-lived; articles focusing on governmental (CIA and FBI) wiretapping 
and eavesdropping quickly replaced those dealing with the seemingly less pressing right 
of marital privacy.  Beginning in early 1966, privacy articles focused increasingly on FBI 
and CIA intrusions on individuals.  The number of wiretapping and eavesdropping 
articles notably increased in 1967, likely in conjunction with Katz v. United States. With 
Katz as the exception, articles only occasionally mentioned a Court nomination or state 
court holding.  There was little focus on the Court again until 1968.  Rather, most 
coverage was based on eavesdropping, perhaps because wiretapping and eavesdropping 
directly affected more people than marital privacy issues.  Although laws regulating 
marital privacy may have had broad opposition if enforced, statutes invading marital 
privacy were rarely enforced and therefore did not generate concern within the general 
public.  The newspapers abandoned a more specialized version of privacy, then, and 
centered on actual infractions on everyday private conversations.  Focus on wiretapping 
and eavesdropping did not decrease, but the New York Times began including articles 
about obscenity and privacy in late-1968, likely in anticipation of Stanley v. Georgia.
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Within this timeframe, the New York Times gave relatively constant attention to 
courts and their members.  This includes coverage of Supreme Court decisions, judicial 
nominees, and judges’ ideologies.  Coverage of individual states’ behavior toward 
privacy agencies, committees, cases and legislation also ran consistently throughout this 
period.  The number of titles or citations containing the phrase “right to privacy” or “right 
of privacy” increased at approximately a one-to-one ratio with the number of titles or 
citations using the word “privacy.”  This means that there was little distinction made 
between the phrase “right to privacy” and the word “privacy,” perhaps indicating that the 
press would rather have stressed privacy itself rather than the right.  This could also 
indicate that public consensus was that privacy was clearly a right and did not need to be 
articulated as such.  There was an initial spike in May and June of 1965 immediately 
following the Griswold opinion.  The number of articles dropped again until 1969, when 
the Court released its opinion for Stanley v. Georgia. 
Upon closer examination, the Court does not appear to be the only reason for 
privacy coverage.  Additionally, New York Times coverage seems to follow trends within 
the legislature and other media.  That is, coverage and peaks were initially related to 
issues the Court chose for its docket, but were substantively based on which issues were 
most pressing to Congress and on television.  For example, the Court’s coverage of 
marital privacy lasted for only three months following Griswold. On the other hand, the 
New York Times latched onto governmental eavesdropping and wiretapping in tandem 
with Congressional committee publications and television media interest, initially after 
1966 and much more substantially after 1970.  In other words, the New York Times 
privacy coverage was largely reactive to both Court and political happenings.  It covered 
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events and ideas after they happened, and stressed the relationship between privacy 
invasion and deviants.  Alternatively, fiction books and television media were largely 
provocative.  They captured ideas before they became mainstream, which appears to have 
spurred political and public reaction.   
 Despite the press’ vast discussion of privacy issues, the public was still largely 
unmotivated to act.131 While its awareness assuredly increased, the active discourse 
largely remained within the social and political elite.  The early press attention failed to 
turn social or political attention toward reproductive or marital privacy yet began to 
increase political awareness and public attention about information and technology 
privacy,132 creating new cracks and egging-on others in the dam that held back the surge 
of privacy issues. 
 
131 Regan, P. M. (1995). Legislating privacy : technology, social values, and public policy. Chapel Hill: 
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Privacy's Appearance in The New York Times
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The Political Reaction 
Out of the growing awareness for privacy interests, Congress worked diligently to 
combat the FBI’s behavior.  Liberal senators, in particular, found themselves at odds with 
the FBI over personal privacy intrusions.  One scholar argues that “[p]erhaps the greatest 
[political] controversy during this time…centered on the issue of wiretapping and 
electronic eavesdropping….”133 As a caveat, though, Congress also needed to remain 
steadfast on promoting law and order views that were coalescing into a salient political 
issue for upcoming elections.  Polls indicate that Americans would still relinquish some 
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of their privacy rights to protect them from criminal activity.134 To the public, privacy 
was a right granted to everyone but criminals and deviants.  Public opinion and the broad 
law and order views Congress was coalescing into a salient electoral issue complicated 
Congress’ position as an advocate for non-criminal privacy protections.  Although they 
acknowledged privacy as a value needing regulation, policymakers were unsure about 
how to legislate it given the conflicts between personal demands and societal good.      
The policy process began with an emphasis on the value of privacy, and much of 
the policy debate was framed in terms of an individual interest—privacy—in 
conflict with a social interest—government efficiency, law enforcement, and an 
honest work force….  Missing from the debates was an explicit recognition of the 
social importance of privacy.135 
Policymakers therefore faced conflicting demands between calls for stronger privacy 
protections and the public’s right to know about criminal behavior and governmental 
activity.136 
Still, in 1964, Senator Edward Long’s  (D-Mo.,) Senate Subcommittee on 
Administrative Practices and Procedures, also known as the Long Committee, began 
hearings about federal intrusions and surveillances, tapping and eavesdropping.  While 
the Long Committee investigated the Treasury Department, the IRS, and the Post Office, 
 
134 Survey by Roper Organization. Retrieved November 19, 2006 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper 
Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. 
<http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>. 
135 Regan, P. M. (1995). Legislating privacy : technology, social values, and public policy. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 22-3.   
136 One scholar notes that among the three issues that influence Congressmen’s behavior (reelection, good 
public policy, and influence within the chamber), the most influential is re-election.  In general, she notes, 
privacy issues “do not provoke great electoral support.” Congressmen are unlikely to champion privacy 
protections merely because they think it will gain them electoral support.  Those congressmen who did 
avidly pursue privacy legislation did so for other, more ideologically sound reasons.  This could explain 
one reason that, although privacy issues gained salience during the 1960s, few elected officials took any 
serious action until the 1970s.  It was not until the 1970s that privacy became such a fundamental issue that 
representatives were willing to take action to protect it, even without an immediate electoral return.  See 
e.g., Regan, P. (1995).  Legislating privacy. Chapel Hill: Univeristy of North Carolina Press. 
62
it avoided the FBI in its first year,137 wanting to begin by taking on smaller, less 
powerful agencies.  Still, they found pitifully little hard evidence that the government had 
engaged in worrying behavior, and when asked, departments such as the General 
Accounting Office fabricated responses or avoided the questioning.  Between 1964 and 
1966, as the above study indicates, the media began the Committee’s work, giving its 
findings some front-page newspaper coverage and prime-time television spots across the 
country; they also stimulated hundreds of alarmed editorials expressing shock at federal 
practices and calling for remedial action.  Senator Long helped to keep the issue bubbling 
by rising on the floor of Congress and reading into the Congressional Record, as his ‘Big 
Brother item for today,’ a variety of news items, editorials, and articles about electronic-
eavesdropping activities.”138 
Despite its difficulty breaking through the bureaucracy’s obstructions, by 1965 
Congress had begun to show “nervous but unmistakable signs of finally wanting to assert 
its long-dormant control over the Bureau.”139 It began investigating the FBI, and 
subpoenaed many FBI and government employees and officers, including J. Edgar 
Hoover himself.  As the Long Committee began uncovering more information, Hoover 
worked harder to keep the FBI’s wiretapping, bugging, mail interception, and break-in 
practices secret.140 
With the help of FBI employee witnesses and whistleblowers, by 1966 the 
Committee had uncovered significant evidence incriminating Hoover and the FBI.  
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However, as Senator Long himself was under investigation for alleged ties to organized 
crime, he agreed to keep the information under wraps.  Cartha DeLoach, one of Hoover’s 
minions, prepared an official release for Long stating that the FBI had not acted illegally 
or without Justice Department supervision.  Long did not agree to release it, however, as 
he feared other members of the subcommittee would leak the wrongdoing.  DeLoach 
went to work on the entire subcommittee, and eventually the Long Committee threat 
collapsed.141 
In addition to the Senate’s Long Committee, the House of Representatives 
established a Special Subcommittee on Invasion of Privacy, mainly due to Representative 
Cornelius Gallagher’s (D, N.J.) request.  Suggesting a vision of the future straight out of 
Orwell, Gallagher warned, “It is our contention that if safeguards are not built into such a 
facility, it could lead to the creation of what I call ‘The Computerized Man.’  ‘The 
Computerized Man,’ as I see him, would be stripped of his individuality and privacy.’”142 
Similar to the Long Committee, the House Privacy Committee held hearings and 
sponsored investigations on illegal government investigatory practices.  These hearings 
were intended to raise public concern about possible privacy abuses resulting from 
technology developments. 
Like the Senate, though, the House Privacy Committee could take only small 
steps to stop the FBI’s behavior.  Occasionally, the Attorney General and his assistants 
would ignore accusations against the FBI entirely, for fear of what would happen if they 
pursued them.  One scholar notes, “There was also little desire to pry into such matters, to 
risk uncovering the unpleasant, or to do combat with Hoover….   In each case, there was 
 
141 Ibid, 365-8. 
142 United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Special Subcommittee on 
Invasion of Privacy. (1967). The computer and invasion of privacy. New York: Arno Press, 2. 
64
danger in combat, so it was better not to know.”143 The latent concern with privacy, 
however, grew into yet another crack in the dam that held back the influx of privacy 
development in later years.  It continued to grow as congress published as much as it 
could.   
Congress’ chipping away at the dam eventually took its toll.  Despite the danger 
in taking-on the FBI, nearly fifty congressional hearings and reports investigated a range 
of privacy issues including federal agency practices, use of personality tests and lie 
detectors, wiretapping, use of census information, and access to criminal history records.  
From 1965 through 1970, over 200 bills related to privacy were introduced, with the 
passage of only the Freedom of Information Act, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970.144 
Following a ten-year campaign in Congress, in which the news media played a 
leading role, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act, its first major piece of 
privacy legislation.  Under the FOIA, the public has the right to know what information 
and records the government holds.  It provides that “‘any person’ has a right, enforceable 
in court, to access to all ‘agency records’—generally, any record in the possession of a 
federal agency,”145 except in one of nine specified circumstances including national 
security issues, trivial information, trade secrets, etc.  This way, information once 
confined strictly within government agency walls was available to the public, making it 
seem as though the FOIA was actually a further infraction on individuals’ privacy rights.  
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Despite its shortcomings, the FOIA was essential to information privacy reform.  Once 
people knew what information the government actually kept, they could work to protect 
themselves. 
Data collection became even more of an issue in further hearings with the Social 
Science Research Council and the Budget of the Bureau.  The two agencies proposed a 
National Data Center to investigate major social and economic problems.  This would 
require storing and cataloging vast information on United States citizens.146 Alarmed by 
its reach, both chambers of Congress rejected proposals for a National Data Center 
twice.147 Yet, Representative Gallagher did not oppose the Data Center entirely.  He 
suggested that the Bureau of the Budget reform its proposal to ensure that the Center’s 
data would be purely aggregate and would contain no information on individuals in hopes 
that compromise would enable stronger privacy protections in the future.148 
In response to the changing climate on privacy, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) issued a statement on privacy.  Less than one year after the Supreme 
Court issued its legally ambiguous privacy holding in Griswold, and despite the 
government’s disagreement on the fundamentality of privacy, the Commission published 
that it would neither encourage nor tolerate governmental eavesdropping due to the 
fundamental right of privacy. 
We have decided that…we should not sanction the unannounced use of listening 
or recording devices merely because one party to an otherwise private 
conversation is aware that the conversation is in fact no longer private….  We 
agree that the ordinary risk of being overheard is converted into another risk 
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entirely when the electronic device is made the instrument of the intruder….  We 
are commanded by the Communications Act to ‘encourage the larger and more 
effective use of radio in the public interest.’…Upon reflection, we do not believe 
it to be consistent with the public interest to permit this new product of man’s 
ingenuity to destroy our traditional right to privacy.149 
This implies that many different branches of the government acknowledged a 
fundamental right of privacy and took steps to protect it. 
The pivotal year in development of a federal wiretapping policy was 1967, 
“during which the issue was the subject of the report of a presidential commission, 
statements from the president, two Supreme Court decisions, and congressional 
hearings.”150 Because privacy was still only an idea, (and it is difficult to legislate ideas,) 
policy-makers needed to tease out the specific functional facets that would make it a 
more easily regulable concept.151 For example, following the ICC’s statement and in 
attempts both to appear strict on criminal issues and to protect individuals’ privacy, 
Congress struggled to pass the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.  
Title III of the Omnibus Act prohibited private telephone eavesdropping and required a 
court order for governmental eavesdropping, except in cases involving national security 
or in which one party consented to the eavesdropping.  Because it was the first case to 
acknowledge that the fundamental right to privacy applies to a person and his 
conversations, Katz v. United States was also credited as an inspiration for this 
legislation.152 Interestingly, this was the first piece of political work to bridge the gap 
between the Court’s dealings with privacy and the government’s activity toward it.    
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The Public 
During the early years of privacy regulation, a conversation emerged among 
scholars, politicians and media elites.  Little evidence suggests that a similar discussion 
was taking place among mass publics.  The nascent public awareness of privacy 
infringements was insufficient to incite public action, as the public felt that some privacy 
invasions were acceptable to protect it from criminals and deviants.153 In fact, despite the 
extensive publicity privacy issues received, public opinion was growing at this time.  In 
October, 1965, after the Long Committee had begun hearings and the Court handed down 
Griswold, 92% of Americans responded that they felt personally satisfied that they had a 
right to privacy.154 In the same poll, Americans ranked the “right to privacy” in the top 
half of the rights most important to them, though only 13% of Americans felt that the 
right of privacy was the most important right,155 indicating that although people believed 
they had the right, it did not inspire political action at this time.  By Westin’s account, as 
Congress, the president and the press continued to put privacy on the public agenda, 
though, public awareness increased.  “Public concern over electronic eavesdropping was 
buttressed by congressional hearings and public debates over the impact on privacy of lie 
detectors and personality testing, making the issue of ‘vanishing privacy’ and ‘Big 
Brother’ a far more general problem than wiretapping by itself had ever become in earlier 
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decades.”156 Like the slogan “guns don’t kill people, people kill people,” technology 
doesn’t invade privacy; agencies using technology do.  Congress, knowing this, found 
agency behavior to be a functional facet of privacy which it could regulate.  
By the end of Johnson’s administration, a complex relationship between public 
opinion, the media, Congress and the realities of LBJ’s ties with the FBI had developed.  
The FBI’s pushing too hard on the privacy issue ended up causing multiple other cracks 
in the dam that had previously held back significant privacy discourse.  For the public as 
well as the legislature, privacy rights triggered conflicting emotions: people wanted 
privacy for themselves, but not for criminals; they wanted safety but not to be listened to.  
Also, the National Data Center proposal was a particular threat to the privacy of 
individuals’ personal information, as it would have created nationalized databanks to 
catalog information on millions of individuals held by hundreds of agencies.157 The 
information held by government agencies like the FBI attracted public concern because 
of the sensitivity of the information the agencies collected.  Meanwhile, the literary 
culture chipped away at the dam by increasing its coverage by publishing books warning 
of a 1984 type world and expanding its privacy coverage to include the Court, the 
president and the legislature.  In response to this and questionable agency behavior, 
Congress became interested in the privacy issue, as well.   
 
Conclusion 
As polls and public action toward Congress’ handling of privacy indicate, the 
public became more aware of and willing to take action to protect their own privacy 
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rights during the 1960s.  It demanded more stringent protections of their newly acquired 
and still legally tenuous fundamental right to privacy.  That there is scant data flagging an 
exact time public opinion reached a drastic turning point against government intrusions 
on privacy, though, indicates a gradual progression toward nationwide awareness rather 
than a sharp shift in public ideology.  The public’s gradually increasing political activity 
throughout this time, in other words, indicates a burgeoning awareness and willingness to 
take action that would balloon throughout the early 1970s.   
Although the Court’s early dealings with legal privacy had less effect on public 
opinion than FBI behavior and government legislation, the public still looked to it as a 
source for privacy protection.  Westin writes, “…the eyes of the press and informed 
citizens remained fixed on two basic sites [for privacy protections]—Capitol Hill and the 
United States Supreme Court building.”158 This would set the stage for the next phase in 
privacy development: Nixon’s administration and the Burger Court.   
 
158 Westin, A. (1967). Privacy and freedom. New York: Atheneum, 206. 
70
Chapter 4: Nixon’s Privacy 
 
With many small cracks beginning to form in the wall that retained a surge of 
privacy awareness and activity, events under Nixon’s presidency continued to weaken it.  
The spread of governmental privacy intrusions, press coverage and Congressional 
investigations had expanded to the point that, by mid-1973, the public was fully aware of 
and engaged in the discourse.   The combination of press militancy, Congressional fervor, 
ceaseless government intrusions, and a newly mobilized public at last enabled privacy to 
become a statutorily recognized fundamental right, albeit nearly a decade after the Court 
declared it a fundamental right.  The path that privacy followed in the last stage before it 
became statutorily fundamental was tumultuous.   
First, the executive government continued to alienate the public, increasing its 
unscrupulous privacy intrusions.  Engaging newly-created governmental entities to aid 
him, and dissolving those that countered him, President Nixon was unrestrained in his 
ardor to gain leverage on his political opponents by wiretapping, spying, and stealing 
classified information.  After the highly publicized Pentagon Papers trial, in particular, 
the general public became aware for the first time that the government was obsessively 
spying on American citizens.  The trial generated such interest that the press became 
focused on exposing government misdeeds, publicizing every instance of government 
spying and privacy intrusion it could document.  The press drastically changed both the 
content and scope of its privacy coverage.  It shifted its focus from Court-related privacy 
happenings to privacy activity in the executive branch, and increased its coverage of this 
activity three-fold.  Congress simultaneously separated itself from executive behavior, 
working to expose executive actions and protect citizens from these actions.  The number 
71
of Senate and House subcommittees dealing with privacy ballooned before 1973 to 
further educate the public about government spying and exacerbate public distrust.  This 
resulted in a dramatic increase in public awareness of privacy issues in general, and the 
privacy-movement finally gained the momentum necessary to mobilize the public.  The 
change in the public’s mood and underlying assumptions, if already skeptical because of 
Vietnam, turned decidedly cynical in a very short period following the Pentagon Papers’
publication.159 
The only player absent from the increasingly pressurized privacy dialogue was the 
Supreme Court.  Though it remained in its own realm handling the privacy of criminals 
and deviants, and abstained from the dialogue about governmental intrusions on citizens’ 
privacy, it still played a key role in advancing privacy’s momentum in the 1970s.  First 
and more obviously, it advanced the canon of case law relevant to a litany of civil 
liberties issues such as obscenity, criminal justice and social deviance.  Second, the 
Court’s general inaction toward privacy unless it pertained to criminals or deviants 
compounded the justices’ refusal to specifically guarantee absolute privacy rights (even 
from the government).  This mobilized Congress and the press, which in turn further 
awakened the public.  As only one example of a prominent theme in academic thought, 
one scholar notes that the Court still played a fundamental role in privacy’s development 
over time.  
Personal privacy, particularly informational privacy, emerged in the 1970s as an 
issue of public policy, partly because judicial policies and constitutional 
interpretation failed to promote legal recognition of and protection for 
individuals’ claims that their right of privacy entails safeguards against abuse of 
personal information collected, maintained, and utilized by the government.  
Development of public policies relating to personal information and, more 
generally, to information control within the federal government, are partially a 
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response to the Court’s failure to legally recognize individuals’ privacy interests 
and claims with regard to personalized information held by third parties, in both 
the public and private sector.160 
In other words, unrelated actions by the press, the government and the Court combined to 
give privacy potency in American dialogue.  This chapter explores privacy’s 
developments in the seemingly disparate realms of American politics as they 
compounded each other to give privacy the momentum it needed to surge into American 
life.   
 
Nixon Pre-Watergate 
Before he even came to the White House, Richard Nixon engaged the issue of 
privacy.  On April 29, 1966, in his only Supreme Court appearance, private attorney 
Richard Nixon argued for an individual’s right to privacy in Time, Inc. v. Hill. Nixon 
argued that the plaintiff, who claimed that Life magazine falsely reported about a new 
play portraying a traumatic event for the plaintiff and his family, was protected from the 
media’s intrusion on his right to personal privacy.  He chose to represent the Hill family 
based on his own personal conviction that Justice Brandeis was correct—that there was a 
“right to be let alone.”161 To Nixon’s dismay, the Court held that because Hill’s 
experience was public knowledge, he was not entitled to privacy protections, and Nixon 
lost the case.  In 1966, it was not an unusual opinion, but Nixon did not take the decision 
lightly.  Nixon blamed himself for the loss, thinking he could have presented better 
arguments.  “In a lengthy memorandum written the next day…, Mr. Nixon critiqued his 
own effort, exploring in detail what other points he might have raised using the Ninth and 
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Tenth Amendments ‘to give redress to private citizens where they are injured by other 
private citizens.’”162 Before he ran for the presidency, Nixon clearly felt a strong affinity 
for citizens’ privacy from other citizens, which foreshadowed his public action to protect 
the right.  However, this ambiguous concept conflicted with his desire for law and order, 
and political advantages.  Once he took office, he had the opportunity to reconcile these 
differences.   
Over these years, Nixon learned a great deal from the way Johnson treated 
personal privacy.  Amongst other things, he adopted Johnson’s use of the FBI and other 
investigatory agencies to further his political ends while publicly behaving like a crusader 
for personal privacy protection.  To the public, still recoiling from Johnson and the FBI, 
Nixon was a champion of personal privacy protection.  Much of his behavior was 
comforting to the public, despite that he had taken few actions to evidence his claim.  
Like Johnson, Nixon spoke publicly in favor of personal privacy but acted to restrict 
privacy rights by implementing his own eavesdropping and wiretapping policies.   He 
also self-consciously chose justices whom he believed would restrict criminal rights and 
civil liberties in an effort to maintain a law-and-order ethos.163 
During this time, Nixon continued to spy, illegally under Katz (1967),164 on
political opponents, social deviants, criminals, and anyone else he felt could be a threat to 
his country or his career.  Like Johnson, Nixon was a clever political craftsman.  During a 
time of heightened public fear of attacks wrought by the Cold War and communist 
infiltration, the administration pushed a national security agenda to ease the concern.  
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Using the public’s desire for protection to his advantage, Nixon committed many privacy 
invasions under the guise of national security protection.  Between 1969 and 1971, Nixon 
had placed wiretaps on 13 government officials and four newsmen who he felt might be 
leaking highly classified national security information regarding the Vietnam War.  In 
actuality, the wiretaps were used to gather dirt on his political opponents, as evidenced by 
Nixon’s refusal to remove the taps after the officials left their government positions.165 
Unsatisfied by the scope of the information he collected, Nixon ordered the 
creation and implementation of a Domestic Intelligence Plan in 1970.  Though this 
operation was to be entirely confidential, he still had to give the impression to those 
involved that he was working for national security.  Nixon planned to commit acts and 
use methods that, as he tried to deny were illegal or unconstitutional, to gather 
information on American citizens to further his political ends.  He involved directors of 
the FBI, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency, asking for 
suggestions and options for methods of spying and information gathering.  Nixon 
authorized breaking and entering, opening of personal mail, and electronic 
eavesdropping.  His targets included anti-war demonstrators, black extremists, and 
demonstrators in general.166 Again, to those involved, Nixon claimed both executive 
authority to protect national security and behavior of previous presidents to justify this 
behavior.  That is, because he faced some internal opposition, Nixon still had to defend 
what he was doing whether or not it was public.  J. Edgar Hoover and Attorney General 
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John Mitchell adamantly voiced their objections to the Plan, and Nixon rescinded his 
orders five days later.167 
Rather than scrapping the entire idea, Nixon replaced it in late 1970 or early 1971 
with the newly-created Interagency Evaluation Committee.  Before this agency began to 
function, Nixon became interested in I.R.S. collections of “valuable intelligence-type 
information…as a result of their field audits. 168 Still dissatisfied with the lack of 
information collected, Nixon set up his own specialized investigation unit known as the 
“Plumbers.”169 Between June and August of the following year, the White House used 
information gathered by the Plumbers to develop a list of its political opponents and 
“enemies.”  According to White House Counsel John Dean’s testimony to the Ervin 
Committee, the White house “maintained…an enemies list, which was rather extensive 
and continually being updated.”170 The White House would send lists of these names to 
the IRS and have them investigated.   
The depth of Nixon’s invasions of legality and trust are well-known but 
fundamental to the watershed moment for privacy.  Indeed, Nixon relentlessly and 
illegally worked to ensure his reelection in 1972.  The Committee to Re-Elect the 
President (CREEP), “went beyond political ‘tricks’ to sabotage the Democratic 
candidates.  It undertook a wiretapping and break-in program to spy on the opposition, 
without precedent in American campaigns, and which subsequently set off a national 
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scandal.”171 As the 1972 election approached, Nixon’s administration launched yet 
another massive campaign against antiwar leaders and Democratic officials.  “The White 
House embarked upon a calculated, systematic assault on the integrity of the American 
electoral process for the purpose of assuring Richard Nixon’s reelection in 1972.”172 
Working with top-agents G. Gordon Liddy, E. Howard Hunt, and James McCord, all 
under Nixon’s awareness,173 five CREEP agents were arrested for breaking into the 
Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate hotel in Washington, 
D.C.  Days later, seven more were arrested and jailed.  Immediately after the CREEP 
agents were arrested, Nixon’s administration began a massive cover-up.  Nixon officials 
destroyed evidence, offered false testimony, paid over $450,000 to keep burglars and 
conspirators silent, and blackmailed FBI and CIA agents.174 All the while, President 
Nixon tape-recorded all the conversations that took place in the Oval Office; he was 
successful in covering-up the scandal for over a year.  To further encourage Nixon, his 
“systematic assault” appeared vindicated when he was reelected by a 520-18 electoral 
margin.   
Nixon actually hit his first major stumbling ground with the publication of the 
Pentagon Papers and the resulting highly publicized 1973 trial.  The Pentagon Papers 
were a compilation of US government documents detailing the United States’ political 
and military involvement, and pending failure in Vietnam.  They reflected quite poorly 
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upon Nixon and his predecessors.175 They show utter disregard for the loss of human 
life, both American and Vietnamese, and deep cynicism toward the public.  They express 
the administration’s awareness that the United States had very little chance of winning 
the war, and were intended to be strictly confidential within the State Department.176 
When one scrupulous government official, Daniel Ellsberg, felt the documents needed to 
come forward, he illegally submitted them to the New York Times for publication.177 
Within twelve days, Nixon had suspended publication of the documents, claiming that 
they were private classified government information and that their release would pose a 
national security threat.  It is likely that Nixon did not want the papers released because 
of the negative political impact they would have had, but once again claimed national 
security interest.  In fact, current scholarship indicates that Nixon only opposed the 
publication because he feared a trend in the press that would eventually expose his own 
personal misbehaviors.178 Still, the New York Times’ decision to continue printing these 
government assessments of the war, despite Nixon’s opposition, was challenged by the 
White House.  The Supreme Court ordered that the First Amendment allowed the New 
York Times to continue printing.   
The White House responded again with legal retaliation.  The Justice Department 
indicted Ellsberg and his collaborator, Anthony Russo, for theft and espionage.179 In 
Ellsberg’s highly-publicized trial, Nixon and his right-hand man, John Ehrlichman, sent 
the Plumbers to break-in to Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office and illegally obtain 
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information.  This break-in proved crucial to the case when presiding Judge Byrne 
declared a mistrial, asserting that the evidence was illegitimate.  Byrne stated that he 
likely would have accepted the information had it been legally obtained, and reprimanded 
the administration for dishonest evidence-gathering.  Meanwhile, the press continued to 
increase its coverage of the White House, publicizing as much information about the 
scandal as it could.180 This helped bring Nixon’s illegal privacy-practices to the public 
eye.181 As a result, Nixon came to consider the press his enemy.182 Still, because 
publications exposing dirt on the administration generated such public interest, the press 
became increasingly aggressive in its coverage of government misdeeds.  This had two 
key effects.  First, it began to raise citizen distrust of the government.  Second, it set the 
press on its path to persistently follow Watergate developments as they occurred based on 
the public’s newly solidified right to know.183 By the time Watergate details started to 
pour from the press, the increasingly distrustful public was particularly apt to absorb 
them.  One scholar notes that The Pentagon Papers ordeal laid the foundation for 
Watergate.  The Pentagon Papers “ushered in a new era of press militancy in which 
journalists would see their primary function as exposing government sins rather than 
simply reporting what government said and did.  Indeed, it is possible that without The 
Pentagon Papers exposure of Watergate would not have occurred.”184 Thus, the 
resulting incident added yet another significant crack to the dam that held back privacy.  
Unbeknownst to anyone involved, it had but two years before it would breach entirely.   
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The Media  
Fueled by the Pentagon Papers scandal, the press publicized the administration’s 
privacy violations with increasing fervor.  But even before the scandal arose, the press 
had increased its coverage of privacy-related events.  Interestingly, Life magazine and the 
Washington Post were involved with illegal wiretapping.  Investigative reporters used 
private taps to further their own ends, though they still published stories on the 
government’s eavesdropping and illicit use of wiretaps.185 Results from the New York 
Times study discussed in Chapter 3 tell a great deal about privacy post-1970.  While the 
content of the articles increased gradually in depth and substance between 1965 and 
1970, frequency, length, and focus of coverage exploded in 1970, as seen in Graph 3.1.  
Of the 47 total front page references to privacy, 41 (93.6 percent) of them occurred in 
1970 or later.  The articles became focused on privacy or the “right to privacy,” rather 
than merely mentioning it.  As indicated in the graph below, the number of citations or 
abstracts containing the word “privacy” nearly doubled between 1965 and 1975.  
Similarly, the number of articles with the phrase “right to privacy” or “right of privacy” 
in the abstract or citation more than tripled between 1965 and 1975, but increased by 
more than 3.5 times between 1970 and 1975.     
 Privacy coverage reached an all time high immediately following Stanley, but
dipped into the lowest it had been since 1966.  Coverage rebounded in 1971 when the 
Court issued four privacy-centered holdings.  The number of privacy-related articles rose 
again most dramatically between 1971 and 1973, during the Pentagon Papers scandal.  In 
fact, 63 percent of front page articles occurred in or after 1972.  At the end of the scandal, 
the militant press also published Watergate-related information as soon as it could.  With 
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such information coming to the limelight, the public was primed to receive the Roe 
opinion when the Court handed it down in 1973.   
Post-1970 press attention increased social and political awareness of reproductive 
and marital privacy, particularly in the months leading up to and immediately following 
Roe. As limitations on abortion were much more easily enforced than those regulating 
sexual conduct behind closed doors, it seems logical to assume that people felt their 
sexual privacy rights were in jeopardy.  In addition to piquing public interest on 
reproductive privacy, post-1970 press attention began to increase political awareness and 
public attention about information and technology privacy, likely because the common 
citizen had few other outlets to learn about these issues.  Whereas the elite and the 
government were engaged in a privacy dialog before 1970, general public awareness and 
activity likely increased along with press attention. 
 
Quarter 
Number of Articles with 
“Right to Privacy” or 
“Right of Privacy” in text
Number of Articles with 
“Right to Privacy” or 
“Right of Privacy” in 
Citation or Abstract
Number of Articles with 
"Privacy" in abstract or 
citation
Jan-Mar 1970 25 0 7
Apr-Jun 1970 12 0 11
Jul-Sep 1970 18 1 6
Oct-Dec 1970 20 0 6
Jan-Mar 1971 35 1 17
Apr-Jun 1971 39 3 9
Jul-Sep 1971 12 0 5
Oct-Dec 1971 39 0 16
Jan-Mar 1972 47 2 15
Apr-Jun 1972 27 1 7
Jul-Sep 1972 44 3 18
Oct-Dec 1972 49 0 11
Jan-Mar 1973 38 5 24
Apr-Jun 1973 28 1 16
Jul-Sep 1973 25 0 22
Table 4.1—New York Times Privacy Coverage per Quarter: 1970-1974 
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Oct-Dec 1973 14 1 15
Jan-Mar 1974 44 6 18
Apr-Jun 1974 46 8 32
Jul-Sep 1974 36 3 15
Oct-Dec 1974 39 4 17
Congress and the Public  
Congressmen and their staffs also played a vital role in the dissemination of truths 
about privacy, developing an increasing interest in regulating governmental privacy 
intrusions.  Leadership in these movements came from chairs of myriad congressional 
committees and subcommittees.  In the Senate, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D.—NC) led 
the brigade because of the thousands of complaints that he, as committee chair, received 
on a range of issues, “including polygraphs, background checks, and census 
questions.”186 In 1970, he initiated a four-year study on government information banks 
of private personal information.187 Senator Ervin also chaired the most prominent and 
persistent privacy committee, known as the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights.  
Ervin dedicated the committee’s work to provide “the first public forums for an incipient 
privacy community” in 1971. He responded both to concerned citizens and because he 
recognized the need for a legislative body to take charge of the issue and make the public 
aware of government activities.   
In building congressional support for legislation, Senator Ervin acknowledged the 
importance of providing detailed information on agency practices and their effects 
on individuals.  The thousands of complaints that the subcommittee received 
increased Senator Ervin’s commitment to the issue.  He also routed the 
complaints of citizens to the senators who represented them, which worked to 
broaden the Senate’s interest in and concern about the federal government’s 
information practices.188 
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The Ervin Committee study found more than 858 data banks in 54 agencies containing 
more than 1.25 billion files on individuals.189 Ervin’s committee made these findings 
public, which assuredly provoked informed citizens.  As indicative of the new mood 
developing on Capitol Hill, Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1971 which 
established that an individual should be informed of the “nature and substance” of 
information held about him and could amend the information to ensure its accuracy.190 
This public activity grew from a latent to a real interest in privacy, where the now 
informed public was no longer willing to passively stand by.191 Growing elite public 
interest and key behind-the-scenes participants in formation of these subcommittees aided 
the trickle-down to the general public.  People like Alan Westin, director of Washington, 
D.C.’s branch of the ACLU Privacy Committee, Hope Eastman, Arthur Miller, and 
Ervin’s Subcommittee staff were all critical in making the elite discourse general public 
knowledge.192 As the discourse filtered from the elites to the common citizen, a policy 
community of citizens and legislators began to form, calling for (but not yet demanding) 
specific regulations.193 
When they began to arise in the 1960s, privacy policy issues did not fit easily into 
the existing policy subsystem.  Within a policy subsystem, one scholar agues, is an 
established community of specialists, “researchers, congressional staff, interest-group 
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advocates, academics, and government analysts.”194 But because privacy was such a fresh 
issue in American discourse, it was too new to have an established subsystem and was 
too amorphous to warrant enforceable, overarching regulations.  Therefore, new systems 
had to be developed.  Two types of policy systems emerged from this gap in privacy 
support.  One core policy community began with interest in “general privacy issues” and 
existed alongside other “specialized privacy communities, or advocacy coalitions,” which 
were concerned with specific aspects of privacy.  The two types of communities worked 
with legislators by formulating position papers and policy alternatives, discussing ideas, 
holding meetings to develop consensuses, and drafting legislative proposals to create 
enforceable privacy regulations.195 Also because the privacy issue was so new, many 
individuals with diverse perspectives and ideas came together to put further pressure on 
Congress to regulate privacy.196 This activity portended the flood.   
The Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI, the most prominent leftist 
activist group, took a stand against FBI wiretapping.  In 1971, several members broke 
into a Pennsylvania FBI office and absconded with over 1000 classified documents 
detailing the FBI’s involvement in the Cointelpro operation.  They mailed the documents 
anonymously to several major American newspapers.  While many newspapers declined 
to publish the Commission’s findings, WIN Magazine, a journal associated with the War 
Resisters League published the documents in their entirety in 1972.  The press and public 
were outraged, and demanded a change.197 
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Also in 1972, two important studies were published for citizen consumption.  
First, Alan Westin and Michael Baker wrote Data Banks in a Free Society, pointing out 
the computer’s new capabilities and calling for new legislative, administrative and 
judicial measures to “define and assure rights of privacy and due process.”198 The study 
highlighted profiles of governmental, commercial and private organizations that keep 
information records on citizens.  It also discussed public policies necessary to keep up 
with burgeoning technology and amplified suspicion and curiosity.199 The second study, 
Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, sponsored by the US Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare and conducted by the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on 
Automated Personal Data Systems, recommended that record-keeping organizations, 
particularly governmental ones, adhere to five fundamental principles of “fair 
information practices” as outlined in the FOIA.  This statement of principles gives us a 
measure of the thinking at the time.  The principles were first that there must be no 
personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret; second that there 
must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and 
how it is used; third that there must be a way for an individual to prevent information 
about him that was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other 
purposes without his consent; fourth that there must be a way for an individual to correct 
or amend a record of identifiable information about him; and fifth that any organization 
creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable personal data must 
assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take precautions to 
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prevent misuse of the data.200 In short, these principles emphasized a particular “right to 
know” relationship between the citizen and the government.  Essentially, trends 
demonstrated Congressional insistence that the public had both a right to know what the 
information the government kept and a right to ensure its accuracy.  Congress took these 
regulations very seriously, as they would appear in several pieces of later legislation.   
In response to this legislative and public pressure, the FBI ceased its Cointelpro 
operation, and the Federal Establishment of Wiretapping Jurisdiction—the single most 
significant privacy invader—cut its wiretap usage by 25% (from 281 wiretaps in 1971 to 
210 in 1972,) and again by 35% (from 210 wiretaps in 1970 to 130 wiretaps) between 
1972 and 1973.  Combined, from 1971-1973, the central federal wiretapping agency cut 
its wiretap usage by over 50%.201 
Conclusion 
This rapid, substantial decrease in federal privacy intrusion was no small affair.  
Not only did it exemplify a marked increase in federal valuation of citizens’ privacy, but 
it indicated the effectiveness of Congress and the press to produce results.  Whether the 
push came from the legislature or the press and eventually the public, things began to 
change.  Pressure came from Congress, which relentlessly investigated federal 
government privacy infringements.  By forming numerous committees and holding 
hundreds of hearings to find out the truth, it began taking the necessary steps to solve the 
privacy problem.  Likewise, the press took great interest in publicizing as much 
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governmental privacy activity as it could find, relating to the federal privacy invaders, 
Congress and the Court.  Gradually, the information from Congress and the press began 
to filter down to the American public, still remaining largely in an elite discourse but 
slowly gaining salience in the general public.  By 1973, the combination of 
Congressional pressure and increasing public awareness left privacy with little chance of 
remaining in the deeper areas of the American mentality.  It would soon come to the 
forefront of American legal, social and political thought, demanding regulation and 
protection.   
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Chapter 5: The Flood of 1973 
With pressure mounting from multiple directions, the government, and the media 
all made American society more attuned to privacy and contributed to growing public 
sensitivity toward the new public issue.  In 1973, two seemingly unrelated events 
provided the pressure that enabled an all-inclusive privacy discourse.  Not only did both 
of these events involve privacy, but they incorporated numerous other issues that gained 
them national salience.  They each included discussions of federalism and deviance, 
which brought additional attention to their inherent privacy debates.  First, the Court 
handed down its opinion for Roe v. Wade (1973), which returned privacy to the forefront 
of legal thought, this time with significant press and public attention.  It made a clear 
statement about reproductive privacy and the fundamentality of the privacy right.  This 
time, it was not criminals’ and deviants’ privacy that was under siege; the privacy of 
everyday women was also in jeopardy of being officially denied by the federal 
government.  Wherever it could be found in the Constitution, the Court argued, privacy 
encompassed the right to an abortion.   
Second, the Watergate scandal enabled rapid dissemination of news about 
information privacy invasions.  While governmental privacy intrusion was easily 
overlooked by the average non-newspaper reading citizen, the Watergate scandal brought 
awareness of government misdeeds to nearly everyone.  Though Watergate did not 
violate the average citizen’s privacy, it prompted a public loss of trust that even the White 
House was no longer capable of discretionary power. 202 Once the public has lost trust in 
the administration, it was primed to absorb news of governmental privacy invasions.  
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Any average American could have been under the executive looking glass, and because 
of Watergate, every average American was aware of that fact.  The White House’s 
misdeeds made the public vulnerable so that when Congress disseminated its committee 
findings and the press publicized what the government was doing, people were finally 
ready to believe it.  
It is no surprise that the separate interpretations of privacy, one regarding 
sexuality and the other regarding information, affected different behaviors in the Court 
and Congress.  Interestingly, though, the two also complemented one another.  Where 
Congress lacked in its coverage of reproductive privacy, the Court took over.  And where 
the Court neglected to deal with information and technology privacy, Congress excelled.  
Whichever direction an inquiring citizen looked, whether toward the Court or toward the 
legislature, privacy was there; it was virtually unavoidable.  Because of multiple-fold 
activity from two different branches of government about two dissimilar areas of privacy, 
which gave privacy extreme vitality in many areas of society, Congress was highly 
pressured to actually protect privacy.  At last, privacy could be broken down into its 
component parts—reproductive, criminal, and informational—to the point that each part 
could be regulated.  As a result of its Watergate and Roe v. Wade, the privacy dam, which 
resulted from confused inaction toward the right, crumbled.  Between 1973 and mid-
1974, Congress proposed (but did not pass) hundreds of pieces of privacy legislation, the 
press tripled its coverage of a range of privacy issues, the public engaged in the civic 
discourse.203 The President echoed this activity in his speeches and calls for legislation.  
In an effort to pass a comprehensive and satisfying piece of legislation in the term 
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following Roe and Watergate, Congress hastily passed the Federal Privacy Act on 
December 31, 1974.    
 
October 11, 1972 Roe v. Wade oral arguments 
January 22, 1973 Roe v. Wade decided 
January 30, 1973 Former Nixon aides G. Gordon Liddy and James McCord Jr. 
convicted of conspiracy, burglary and wiretapping in Watergate 
incident 
April-October, 
1973 
 
Nixon's top White House staffers, H.R. Haldeman and John 
Ehrlichman, and Attorney General Richard Kleindienst resign over 
Watergate, others are fired 
May 11, 1973 Ellsberg trial dismissed 
June 3, 1973 Nixon officials tell Watergate investigators that he discussed the 
Watergate cover-up with President Nixon at least 35 times 
July, 1973 The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare publishes 
Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens 
July 23, 1973 Nixon subpoenaed to relinquish Oval Office tapes 
January 30, 1974 Nixon gives editorializing State of the Union address urging 
privacy protections 
February 2-3, 1974 Ervin and Department of Justice introduce two proposals to protect 
privacy 
March, 1974 National Bureau of Standards holds privacy conference 
July 9, 1974 Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren conference held on privacy 
August, 1974 Nixon resigns 
November 21, 1974 House and Senate override President Ford’s veto and pass the 
FOIA amendments 
Dec 11-22, 1974 Senate and House pass versions of the Privacy Act 
December 31, 1974 Finalized Privacy Act passes 
Roe v. Wade 
When the Court handed down its opinion for Roe v. Wade in January of 1973, it 
was an outlier for three reasons.  First, it was riddled with highly controversial and 
divisive content.  Also, it threatened to close the door, federally, on privacy of not 
criminals and deviants, but of everyday wives and daughters.  For those who were willing 
to ignore the Court’s previous privacy decisions because they had no commonplace 
Table 5.1—Timeline of Relevant Events
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applicability, privacy finally began to have bite.  Unconcerned that the Court was not 
willing to frame the rights of a sexual deviant or a murderer, as privacy issues applied to 
all women, the public suddenly took interest.  Last, though the Court previously hinted at 
a birth of a comprehensive concept of privacy, it was at last willing to extend the right in 
Roe.  Not only did it acknowledge the right, but it neglected to grapple with the right’s 
origin and scope.  Because Roe was an anomaly, its deviation from Court norms 
compiled with its inflammatory content generated heavy publicity.  It left political and 
academic elites with a feeling of incompleteness.204 After the Court acknowledged that 
the ethereal privacy right subsumed the right to an abortion, which was a narrowly-
tailored and quite specific statement, it could have brought to light the myriad vacancies 
in privacy recognition.  Put differently, though the Court acknowledged that privacy itself 
could be broad, it only applied it to one specific issue.  This narrow view could have 
brought attention to a vacancy in the privacy right that was still unprotected. 
Because it was an unclearly established point, Roe was highly divisive and 
unsatisfying to both sides.  One scholar notes that Americans “on both sides of the issue 
were astonished by the decision,”205 in the sense that neither side found the legal 
precedent it sought in Roe. Roe encouraged everyone, pro or anti-legalization, to have an 
opinion, those opposed to abortion rejected the notion that the opinion was just or fair, 
and those that supported abortion worried that the decision was legally unsound.  One 
scholar notes that the heart of Roe’s resulting public debate revolved around the fact that 
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the abortion right was grounded in the larger “more encompassing privacy rights.” 206 
Though anti-abortionists would have embraced privacy if it helped to protect a right to 
school prayer, for example, they charged that the Court had “overstepped its bounds” and 
created a new right that did not exist anywhere in the Constitution.  “Nowhere in the 
Constitution, they insisted, was there anything—neither a word nor a phrase—to suggest 
a right of privacy and by association the right to abortion….”207 Interestingly, as the pro-
life contingent came to realize that it also supported the privacy right as applied to school 
prayer and information privacy, it also rescinded its argument that privacy did not exist.  
Instead, they reluctantly accepted the privacy argument, stating that it still did not 
encompass the right to an abortion.  One scholar notes that the Roe debates veered away 
from the privacy realm and became purely about abortion.  “As for justification of the 
privacy right, advocates claimed that privacy, like liberty, ran throughout the Constitution 
rather than being located in any one place within it…  Beaten back by the fact that most 
Americans wanted to believe in a right to privacy, antiabortionists argued that abortion 
was still not about privacy.”208 
Despite that it had been clouded by debate about the rights of the fetus, the main 
issue remained one of a woman’s right to privacy.  The president of the Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America, Dr. Alan Guttmacher, who framed the debate with 
privacy as its foundation, hailed the ruling as “a wise and courageous stroke for the right 
of privacy….”209 Those who had lost sight of the key issue and looked at Roe as an 
abortion case rather than a privacy case were quickly reminded that Roe was indeed a 
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case securing the right to privacy in Constitutional thought.  Roe had made its mark.  
“Allegiance to the privacy precedent established in Griswold and solidified in Roe 
became ‘a litmus test for membership in the ‘mainstream of constitutional thought.’”210 
It had been “enshrine[d]…as a ‘fixed star in our constitutional firmament.’”211 Once the 
Court audaciously declared privacy a fundamental right, the least dangerous branch 
perhaps unknowingly opened the doors for Roe v. Wade, which would become one of the 
twentieth century’s most socially and politically divisive and mobilizing cases.  Due to its 
highly controversial nature, coverage of several legal issues, and deviation from Court 
trends, it gained remarkable publicity for the privacy discussion.  This publicity helped 
push privacy into the mainstream of American discourse.     
 
Watergate Breaks and the Water Gate Breaks 
Meanwhile, in the White House, Nixon was reveling in his 1972 election victory 
and the apparent success of the Watergate cover-up.  As a trend that would eventually 
lead to his political demise, though, “leaks…became the order of the day.”212 These 
leaks became so severe that the privacy dam had little chance of survival.  The well-
known tale glorifies the Washington Post’s Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein for 
publishing information about Watergate from a White House official who called himself 
Deep Throat.  Not only did they publicize, but they played a key role in initiating 
Watergate coverage in other areas.213 They regularly published news of the Watergate 
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cover-up, and influenced other press members to do the same.  Such adamant press 
coverage further contributed to the changing public mood toward the administration.  
Beginning with the Pentagon Papers scandal and continuing through Watergate, the 
public’s trust in the government greatly declined,214 making it more susceptible to further 
coverage of privacy intrusions.  
In June 1973, CREEP officials L. Patrick Gray and James McCord testified before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee tying high-ranking White House officials to the 
Watergate break-in.  Their testimonies blew the cover on the Watergate cover-up.  
Leading newspapers finally caught up with Woodward and Bernstein, printing daily 
articles tying increasingly high-ranking White House officials to the scandal.  Later that 
year, three of Nixon’s closest officials resigned, and John Dean made public the 
president’s involvement in Watergate.  Within months, a grand jury subpoenaed Nixon to 
relinquish the tapes taken of his Oval Office conversations.215 This was the beginning of 
the end for President Nixon but was just the beginning for privacy’s life in the United 
States. 
The instant that speculation of a Watergate scandal came to the public eye, 
President Nixon changed his public stance on privacy.  While he previously opposed 
citizens intruding on other citizens’ privacy, it was not until he was in danger of being 
exposed that he took any serious action to legally protect individuals’ rights to privacy 
from government intrusions.  In his 1974 State of the Union address, Nixon championed 
privacy. 
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One measure of a truly free society is the vigor with which it protects the liberties 
of its individual citizens. As technology has advanced in America, it has 
increasingly encroached on one of those liberties--what I term the right of 
personal privacy. Modern information systems, data banks, credit records, mailing 
list abuses, electronic snooping, the collection of personal data for one purpose 
that may be used for another--all these have left millions of Americans deeply 
concerned by the privacy they cherish.  
And the time has come, therefore, for a major initiative to define the 
nature and extent of the basic rights of privacy and to erect new safeguards to 
ensure that those rights are respected.  
I shall launch such an effort this year at the highest levels of the 
Administration, and I look forward again to working with this Congress in 
establishing a new set of standards that respect the legitimate needs of society, but 
that also recognize personal privacy as a cardinal principle of American liberty.216 
Though he found the idea ideologically compelling, perhaps Nixon had such a 
difficult time respecting privacy in practice because he sought to gain quite a lot from 
spying.  Most likely, Nixon wanted to support the right against privacy intrusions from 
everyone but himself.  He called for legislation and publicly condemned governmental 
snooping but continued to snoop himself.  Though it would be difficult to isolate what 
caused the shift in his stance, there are two possible motivating factors.  First, it is 
possible that he translated his desire to protect himself from further governmental 
intrusions into his private behavior into a desire to protect all citizens from governmental 
intrusions.  Or, perhaps Nixon shifted his opinion in a last-ditch effort to regain the 
public’s trust and affection.  Regardless of why Nixon changed his stance, as speculation 
turned into fact, the righteous Senator Ervin started a committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities, also known as the Watergate Committee, to investigate and 
publicize Nixon’s indiscretions.  Also by the time of Watergate, the pressures on the FBI 
would be too significant for it to avoid a full disclosure about its illegal activities with the 
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President to Congress.  The Second Article of Impeachment, “Improper Use of 
Intelligence Agencies,” made available every unseemly detail about Nixon’s romp with 
the FBI that the public did not already know. 217 Still, it would take Congress and the 
courts the next year to organize their approach to the Watergate issue.  Nixon continued 
the presidency as normal, with privacy as a new cause.  Still, the momentum from more 
than a decade of build-up pushed privacy to a point of no return.   
 
The Flood 
Privacy flooded the press in January 1974, perhaps in response to President 
Nixon’s incendiary State of the Union address drawing attention to the need for more 
privacy protections and the Watergate scandal.218 Prior to the 1974 peak, it appears that 
spikes in New York Times coverage of privacy issues are largely Court related; they 
covered Court cases and subjects as they became relevant.  Interestingly, between 1972 
and 1975, only 9 of the 34 articles with “privacy” in the citation or abstract mentioned 
Watergate somewhere in the document text.  In other words, only about ¼ of the articles 
the New York Times wrote about privacy were explicitly connected to Watergate.  This 
low number of articles linking Watergate and privacy indicates that press interest in 
privacy developed independently from but simultaneously with the Watergate.    But the 
spike in privacy-related articles during this time indicates an overall growing interest in 
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the issue.  This further supports that Watergate fueled interest in privacy but did not 
become tangled in the privacy discourse.  By 1973, privacy had a “life of its own.”219 
A flood of congressional interest in the privacy issue also surged after the FBI 
came forward and Watergate became household information.  Committees that had no 
prior interest in privacy dedicated at least some of their work to investigating and 
attempting to regulate privacy.  Some of these committees included the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy, Senate Appropriations Committee, Senate Armed Services 
Committee, Preparedness Subcommittee to the Armed Services Committee, Senate 
Judiciary Committee, House Judiciary Committee, Senate Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Labor Management Relations of the Senate Committee 
on Labor and Public Welfare, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Senate 
Subcommittee on Internal Security.  All the different committees interested in privacy 
were having difficulty coordinating schedules for hearings and meetings.  Rather than 
consolidating their efforts, then, they published many different reports with similar 
findings.  This explosion of published revelations disturbed the public and mobilized a 
broader range of supporters.  Ervin’s committee and Gallagher’s committee actually 
“competed for ownership of the privacy issue,” which further publicized congressional 
interest.220 Hearings also made public the human-interest stories and anecdotal accounts 
of privacy invasions, which made them newsworthy.  The publicized human element 
made issues more real to the public.  They also inclined the public to take the side of the 
individual over the societal benefits of information gathering.  The Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare published Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, a key 
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study on privacy and technology.  It held that even though technology had exploded 
during the 1970s, it was not the culprit; it merely gave agencies a more convenient 
method to catalog information on citizens.221 This suggestion likely converted anyone 
who still blamed privacy intrusions on technology to the alternative frame that the people 
in power were abusing the technological advancements.  By this time, the public was 
fully mobilized to participate in the democratic process by writing congressmen and 
participating in the civic discourse.222 
Proposals for privacy protections emerged from all imaginable corners of 
Congress.  In fact, the Ninthird Congress came to be called the ‘Privacy Congress,’ 
principally because of the vast number of bills introduced between 1973 and 1974.  
Congress discussed approximately 250 bills relating to the Omnibus and the Fair Credit 
Reporting Acts, criminal justice information, bank records, and wiretapping.223 The 
Privacy Congress enacted two major privacy statutes— the Family Educational Rights 
(the Buckley Amendments) and Privacy Act of 1974.  At its most basic level, nearly all 
proposed legislation called for citizens to know when and if information was held on 
them.  Nearly as many would have required that citizens could access the information 
held about them and check it for accuracy.  From there, some bills called for federal 
oversight, others called for state agency protection, and others still would have formed 
personal citizens’ committees to monitor information practices. Congressional studies 
found that the variance between various privacy policies were frequently crosscutting or 
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contradictory, rendering them ineffective.  These conflicts necessitated the attempt at a 
nationalized privacy policy.224 
Realizing this, Nixon worked even harder for such a policy.  In his 1974 State of 
the Union address, Nixon called for a “major initiative” to safeguard individuals’ “rights 
of privacy.”  Less than two days later, the Justice Department jumped forward with a 
proposal for a feasible bill.  Senator Ervin came forward with an even more restrictive 
bill.  The Department of Justice bill would have required that citizens could review the 
information held about them, check it for accuracy, and sue anyone who improperly 
disclosed it.  The proposal would also have required that personal records be sealed after 
a certain time period.  Ervin’s bill went one step further.  He proposed to place the entire 
criminal justice data system under the supervision of a nine-man board.  While neither 
bill passed in its entirety, each had bi-partisan sponsorship and contained principles the 
majority of congressmen could support.225 
By early-1974, privacy had both exploded in American discourse and become a 
bi-partisan concern.  At the National Bureau Standards Conference in March of 1974, 
Congressmen gathered to discuss a national privacy policy.  As the participants noted, the 
purpose of the conference was to enact action-oriented programs which would ease “the 
problems of data confidentiality and computer security.”226 Congressman Edward I. 
Koch (D-NY) said, “If there is any legislation that I believe requires the support of 
everyone…it’s legislation to ensure the right of privacy.”  Congressman Barry M. 
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Goldwater, Jr. (R-CA) also urged congressional action toward a nationalized privacy 
statute.  After the conference, Congressmen Koch and Goldwater co-sponsored a new 
bill, HR 14163, to define information practices to protect personal data files held by both 
the government and the private sector. 227 
Later on June 7-8, 1974, at the Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on 
Advocacy in the United States, scholars, former law enforcement officers and 
organization leaders of all political persuasions gathered to discuss protection from 
governmental intrusions on personal privacy.  Just two months after the National Bureau 
of Standards Conference, privacy conferences had become commonplace.  At this 
gathering, the conferees concurred that the most basic “informational” privacy a person 
can have is control over the “collection and use of personal information about 
themselves.”228 They agreed that no type of governmental electronic eavesdropping or 
information gathering should be allowed without a warrant.  “A substantial majority 
recommended that no surveillance for intelligence purposes be permitted.”229 The 
conference almost unanimously agreed on two recommendations to the government, 
asserting that it should not be allowed to continue its current practices. 
[First,] every government agency should be barred from collecting any data 
concerning political activity, association, or expression—protected under the First 
Amendment—and should destroy any such data now in existence in both 
legislative and executive agencies.  [Second] there should be no use and 
placement of a human agent for surreptitious surveillance, except upon court 
order based on probable cause and subject to the same restraints and restrictions 
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as the use and employment of the surreptitious electronic eavesdropping devices 
and techniques now provided for by the Omnibus Crime Bill.230 
Clearly these concerns arose out of fears that the government would continue to intrude 
in the way it had over the last fifteen years.  Interestingly, many conferees did not wish to 
extend stringent privacy protections to criminals, 231 implying that only people not 
deserving of the fundamental right to privacy were criminals and deviants.  As they made 
no mention of law-abiding women or intimate privacy, for example, we are to assume 
that the conference favored privacy protections for everyone else.  As a result, by late 
1974, the government used wiretaps to eavesdrop on little more than gamblers and 
criminals.  This drop in government snooping was not enough to keep Richard Nixon 
from resigning the presidency in August of 1974.  Though a less aggressive Gerald Ford 
took Nixon’s place, the privacy issue had gained such force in society that nothing could 
stop the insurgence of privacy activity.   
The Court’s responsibilities for issuing the warrants and hearing the claims of 
invasion of privacy and illegal surveillance gave it a key role in these discussions.  This 
conference stated that the government was to assume there was enough evidence to 
convict a person before installing the tap.  The courts were therefore hesitant to convict 
people charged using illegally-obtained evidence.  Less than 1/3 of illegal taps resulted in 
a conviction, even though they supplied incriminating evidence, which indicates that 
courts were acquitting people that would likely have been found guilty without illegally-
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obtained tap evidence.232 Even so, the Court remained focused largely on 
reproductive/marital privacy and citizens’ privacy protections from other citizens.   
In response to mounting pressure from all areas of society, Congress took two 
steps to protect individuals’ rights to privacy from the government.  First, it updated the 
FOIA, overriding President Ford’s veto, and second, it proposed the Federal Privacy Act 
of 1974.   The 1974 version of the FOIA and the Privacy Act demonstrated a 
congressional attempt to balance an individual’s right of privacy with the preservation of 
the public’s right to Government information.233 
In an effort to pack privacy legislation into 1974, on December 31, Congress 
passed the Privacy Act of 1974.  Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens and the 
FOIA’s “five points” provided the initial framework for the Privacy Act.  After extensive 
hearings in both chambers, both the Senate and the House passed the bill.  Because 
Congress passed the Privacy Act in such haste, it was highly problematic.  First, the 
House of Representatives and the Senate passed two different versions of the bill, whose 
differences included the creation of a Privacy Protection Study Commission, rule-making 
processes, damage recovery policy, standards for data collection, and provisions for 
mediating conflicts between the FOIA and the Privacy Act. 234 Members of the House 
and the Senate compromised, and legislation was signed into action on December 31, 
1974.  Interestingly, the final version of the bill did not actually protect an individual’s 
“right to be let alone.”  It instead gave a citizen access to the information held about him 
and a degree of power to change that information.  The Privacy Act recognized that, 
while the government was still entitled to hold information on citizens, it should do so in 
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a public and fair way.   The Privacy Act also indicated that electronic eavesdropping 
violated the Fourth amendment, giving privacy roots in the Bill of Rights.  While the 
Privacy Act grants individuals rights to access their own personal files kept by 
government agencies and to keep them from being disclosed except for the purposes of a 
case-specific investigation, the 1974 FOIA allows citizens to access all federal agency 
records.  If a conflict between the Privacy Act and FOIA arises, for example when 
personal records protected by the Privacy Act are requested under FOIA, the conflict is 
reconciled by Section 552a(b)(2) of the Privacy Act, which gives the public’s right to 
know precedence over its right to keep information secret.235 Yet despite its 
shortcomings and contradictions, the act most importantly declared: “The right of privacy 
is a personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United States.”236 
The Privacy Act was only the beginning.  It created the Privacy Protection Study 
Commission to investigate its efficacy, and impact, and the need for further federal 
legislation.237 It also influenced the founding of numerous other Congressional 
committees to investigate the future of privacy in America, and spurred major journalistic 
interest, including the founding of The Privacy Journal.238 It also required each 
governmental agency to publish an annual notice describing each of its information-
gathering systems, follow strict guidelines to protect subjects’  information and alert the 
subjects of the information held on them and allow the subject to check for accuracy, and 
limit its record-keeping to “information necessary to accomplish an agency function 
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required by law or Presidential order.”239 In other words, Congress had taken many steps 
ensure that privacy intrusions would no longer plague the American system.  The people 
would have their constitutionally, legally and statutorily protected rights to privacy.  
Privacy had become an institutionalized revolution. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is clear that by the time the Privacy Act passed in 1974, the dam that held back 
the surge of privacy activity had crumbled.  Privacy was no longer amorphous or 
overlooked in society.  It was protected, supported, and talked-about.  This was true not 
only with information and technology privacy, but with marital and reproductive privacy, 
as well.  Interestingly, this protection resulted from a two-pronged push, both intentional 
and unintentional, for privacy legislation.  One push stemmed from the Court, which 
specialized in criminal and reproductive privacy.  The other stemmed from Congress, 
which concentrated on information and technology privacy; there was very little overlap 
between the two.  The only overlap stemmed from debates about criminal justice issues, 
which Congress rarely linked back to privacy.  The Congressional Record indicates that 
legislative interest in privacy revolved solely around information and technology privacy 
as understood from the lack of Congressional discussion about reproductive or marital 
privacy rights.240 Even in years in which the Court issued landmark privacy cases, 
Congress only discussed the right to informational privacy.  During Roe v. Wade,
Congress published absolutely no material pertaining to the Court’s version of privacy.  
 
239 Larsen, K. S., Domestic Council (U.S.) Committee on the Right of Privacy, Council of State 
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Government publications during the early 1970s dealt solely with issues of computer 
privacy, privacy of federal employees, banks, criminal justice, data banks, financial 
records, etc.,241 but the House Subcommittees on Postal Operations and Postal Facilities 
and Mail did hold two hearings regarding sexually explicit or “obscene” information sent 
through the mail.  This concern focused on the post and obscenity rather than the privacy, 
though.242 Similarly, the Court rarely dealt with issues of information and technology 
privacy.  Instead, it left those issues to Congress to regulate.  The two disparate areas of 
privacy interest created gaps that the other could fill and combined to form an 
overarching and compartmentalized privacy that could easily be regulated.   
We can attribute a portion of this somewhat surprising lack of overlap in approach 
to the different parties informing the Court and Congress.  The set of interest groups that 
filed amicus briefs in cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, Katz v. United States and Roe v. 
Wade was largely distinct from the set of groups that testified to Congress in its 
committee hearings before it passed the Federal Privacy Act of 1974.  The Court saw 
significant interest from state attorneys general in its privacy related cases, like Griswold,
Stanley v. Georgia, and Katz v. Untied States, in addition to receiving briefs from many 
individual attorneys.  In its abortion-specific cases, it received briefs from Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America, human rights organizations, religious organizations, 
and several medical associations.243 Congress, on the other hand, called upon technology 
innovators, experts, and individuals involved with governmental-sponsored spying to 
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testify at its committee hearings.244 The American Civil Liberties Union was the only 
group appealing to both the Court and Congress.  This lack of overlap reinforces the 
extent to which privacy was a fractured issue area.  That different facets of privacy had 
different constituencies in society—pushing simultaneously, but pushing for different 
protections from different institutions.  As the press and public joined the debate, they 
added particular voices and emphases to the deliberations in Congress.  With pressure 
mounting, Congress had little choice other than to pass something, but the specifics may 
have been less certain.   
 
244 Congressional Record. 93rd Cong. 1st- 2nd sess. (1974)  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Implications  
 
Though the Court started taking stabs at defining and applying privacy 
immediately after Griswold in 1965, the legislature only began to systematically dissect 
privacy after Roe and Watergate hit the limelight.  The two-pronged influence that 
pushed privacy to the forefront—one stemming from the Courts and one stemming from 
the press and the government, with the public in support of action in both realms—
practically forced the Privacy Act into existence.  Until 1974, privacy was too ethereal to 
elicit sweeping regulation.  With numerous failed prior attempts to regulate privacy, the 
Federal Privacy Act required further research and development of privacy’s many 
components and thus further paved the way for the privacy that we understand today.   
Beginning in the early twentieth century when the Court’s and Congress’ 
interpretations of privacy began to diverge, the concept became less and less clear.  As 
the Court and Congress applied different interpretations of the privacy right to different 
situations, privacy became broader and less easily broken-down for analysis.  Because the 
Court and Congress struggled to consistently apply the right to an array of situations, it 
became more difficult to define and regulate.  Therefore, more than half a century of such 
confused inaction or misaction toward privacy erected something of a privacy dam—a 
blockade that prevented any institutional definition or systematic regulation.  Privacy 
became more obscured by misconception and lack of definition, and America was 
instilled with an idea about an ambiguous right “to be let alone” that had no substantive 
support.   
In general, America did not have a secure enough understanding of privacy to 
take the necessary steps to protect it.  The American public assumed this mysterious right 
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would endure but did not feel the need to take the necessary steps to protect it.  Those 
steps would include a systematic breakdown of privacy’s components, narrowly tailored 
regulation, and creation of specialized agencies to track and enforce it. 245 Even if 
Americans wanted to protect privacy, it would have been difficult to regulate such a 
general right.  Legislation would be overbroad and nearly impossible to enforce because 
few people understood it.  The Court’s declaration of privacy to be a fundamental right in 
1965, though, formed the first crack in the dam.  In the decade following, as shown in 
figure 6.1, cracks began to form a result of pressure from the Court, the government, 
intellectual and media elites, and later, the public.   
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Figure 6.1: The Privacy Story 
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First, the Supreme Court pulled the rest of the country along behind its proactive 
privacy holding while it grappled with defining and applying the concept.  Though it 
consistently refused to grant privacy rights to criminals and deviants, the Court captured 
the public by potentially threatening the privacy of regular, non-criminal women.  The 
Justices held that reproductive and marital privacy was fundamental, and garnered 
support from pro-choice organizations, women’s rights organizations, and medical 
organizations.  With little regard from Congress, the Court expanded these views in Roe 
v. Wade, which solidified the Court’s position as the sole arbiter of sexual privacy.  
Simultaneously, privacy was pushed into mainstream thought by the FBI and privacy 
invasions in the White House, Congress, the press and the public.  Congress was aware of 
FBI and executive behavior, which it publicized to the press and the public.  Slowly, the 
public gained awareness of governmental privacy invasions, which the Pentagon Papers 
and Watergate scandals greatly exacerbated.  It is no coincidence that the public was 
more apt to internalize news about governmental privacy invasions only after it had lost 
faith in the White House as a result of the Watergate scandal.  The media also contributed 
by generating unease about the reality of government privacy intrusions.  To combat this, 
Congress dealt almost exclusively with information and technology privacy—the area of 
greatest public and media concern.   
Pressure to regulate privacy coalesced from the push, the pull and the divergent 
interpretations of the privacy right.  Each source mounted pressure until 1973 when the 
combination of Roe v. Wade and Watergate broke the dam entirely, resulting in a flood of 
privacy discourse, legislation and litigation from disparate realms of jurisdiction.  Roe 
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was especially notable because it was an anomaly in the Courts.  First, it deviated from 
the Court’s trend of not applying the right to privacy in most cases.  Second, it deviated 
because it threatened not to grant the fundamental right to everyday women, where it had 
previously threatened not to grant the right to criminals and deviants.  Watergate gained 
attention because it provided, through the press, the hard-hitting realization for the 
American public that the White House was capable of vast indiscretion and was therefore 
untrustworthy.   
After 1973, privacy had become so salient in both the marital and the 
informational realms that it begged analysis, classification, and the protection, resulting 
in the Federal Privacy Act of 1974—an act that would be only the foundation for a litany 
of privacy-related legislation in years to come.  The Privacy Act was a direct result of the 
two-pronged pressure for privacy regulation.  Together, the Court and Congress created a 
comprehensive fundamental right to privacy.   
 It is interesting to speculate about the existence of a Privacy Act absent one or 
both of these prongs.  Without the Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade, Congress likely would 
still have created the Privacy Act; it did not specifically protect the Court’s version of 
privacy, after all.  Without Watergate, Congress would likely have developed the Act 
eventually, as well, but assuredly not with the same haste or gravity.  Doubtless, political 
musterings would have evolved into a substantial piece of privacy legislation, but it is 
unlikely that it would have been as comprehensive or provocative for future government 
action.  But because Watergate facilitated awareness of the extent to which the 
government could violate its citizens, inspired Nixon to speak out against government 
intrusions on people’s privacy, piqued Congressional interest in the scope of government 
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misdeeds, and turned the public mood against the administration, the resulting Privacy 
Act was virtually unavoidable.  The Watergate and Roe combination heavily expedited 
the legislative process, which resulted in a hastily drawn piece of legislation.  At a 
minimum it was a starting place for a privacy with separate component parts that multiple 
levels of society and politics could discuss, monitor, and further regulate.   
This tale indicates several possible themes regarding rights-talk in the United 
States.  First, though issues may be latent in the public consciousness, introduction of a 
catalyst enables the issue to rapidly take-hold.  If the public is unaware of the problem, 
that catalyst can originate from scholarly, media and political attention, which, given 
enough concern, can filter down to the public.  Regardless of the issues that circulate 
amongst political and academic elites, they must enter the public mind in order gain full 
salience.  Absent media attention, which made the privacy issue palatable to everyone, 
the public would likely not become aware of privacy issues and Congress would not have 
made it a fundamental right with such speed or seriousness.  This interpretation of 
privacy’s tumultuous history has revealed and illustrated an example in which legal 
change can emanate out of awareness of a problem that first appears to those at the 
highest level of politics.  In this situation, the impetus for change has flowed from the 
top, down.  I have argued that privacy began in an elite governmental and scholarly 
discourse and gradually filtered down to the public from two directions; first, as press 
publication of and congressional attention to increasingly invasive governmental privacy 
investigations heightened privacy became more salient, and second, as the Court issued 
an anomalous, more widespread holding, the people became more aware.  Essentially, I 
argue that privacy emerged as an elite discourse and percolated down to the public 
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through Congress and the press from two disparate origins—marital/reproductive privacy 
and information/technology privacy.  This model is unique to the privacy movement, as 
the scholarly and political elites were the only ones aware of the privacy problem.  It was 
their consistent attention that pushed privacy into the mainstream.     
Some scholars prefer a bottom-up approach to legal and political change, in which 
they credit citizens, activists and interest groups with initiating legal, political or social 
change movements.246 This approach could be (and is) applied to privacy in the 1960s 
and 70s.  Perhaps it was the same interest groups filing amicus briefs and providing test 
cases to the Court that generated media attention and petitioned Congress to statutorily 
protect their privacy.  Though it is entirely possible that grassroots organizations 
provided the necessary incentive to both the Court and Congress to finally tackle the 
privacy issue, this does not appear to have been the case.  Privacy is an anomaly in this 
way because invasions were just that—they were private.  It is possible that if privacy 
invasions had been common knowledge, the public would have initiated the movement.  
Instead, the public was unaware of the extent to which the government was intruding on 
privacy rights, and remained out of the movement until they became fully aware of the 
problem.   
Also, this story sheds some light on the role of institutions within political 
systems.  Though seemingly independent, all political institutions have one thing in 
common: the public.  As long as someone passes information to the public, institutions 
can be held accountable for their actions.  That is, once the public becomes aware of 
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institutional activity, it can provide the necessary, back-end leverage for social, legal, and 
political change. 
 
Privacy Today 
Presently, the Court deals more extensively with physical privacy—one’s rights to 
his body, home and marriage—that is most easily protected by the penumbras found 
within the Bill of Rights.  It falls to the policymakers, then, to make rules about 
informational privacy—the privacy which was not as easily found within the first ten and 
fourteenth amendments.  In other words, “judicial policies failed to foster a framework 
for and legal safeguards for ensuring privacy interests with respect to mandatory 
nonassociational and nonincriminatory disclosures of personal information, governmental 
access to personal information held by third parties, and governmental storage and 
disclosure of personal information.”247 Between the Court’s mixed interpretations of the 
privacy right and the legislature’s protection of privacy pertaining to different realms of 
society, scholars, both past and present, disagree about the actual state of privacy.  Still, 
we can see that current governmental dealings with privacy developed as a result of 
different views on private property rights in the 1920s.  From that point on, the Court and 
Congress diverged in their interpretations and applications of privacy, growing apart 
throughout the 1960s and ‘70s when they each declared the right to be fundamental, but 
applying it to the different realms we see today.   
In 1891, Justice Cray commented in Union Pacific Railway Company v. Botsford 
that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law than 
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person free from a 
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restraint or interference of others unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”248 
Several decades later, Justice Brandeis articulated privacy’s importance with the same 
fervor, stating that privacy is the “most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued 
by civilized men.”249 Clearly, privacy was important to these men.  But more than a 
century later, we still glorify and herald our fundamental right to privacy.  While its 
definitions and applications have morphed throughout the decades, it still exists steadfast 
in the American psyche.  And it was a two-pronged, top-down influence that set privacy 
on its complex journey to fundamentality from the Court to the country.   
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